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ARTICLES 
Privative Copyright 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh* 
“Privative” copyright claims are infringement actions brought by 
authors for the unauthorized public dissemination of works that are private, 
unpublished, and revelatory of the author’s personal identity. Driven by 
considerations of authorial autonomy, dignity, and personality rather than 
monetary value, these claims are almost as old as Anglo-American copyright 
law itself. Yet modern thinking has attempted to undermine their place within 
copyright law and sought to move them into the domain of privacy law. This 
Article challenges the dominant view and argues that privative copyright 
claims form a legitimate part of the copyright landscape. It shows how privative 
copyright claims derive from considerations that are genuinely authorial and 
seek to redress a form of harm that is unique to the nature of the work involved—
a harm best described as “disseminative.” Tracing the historic evolution of 
privative copyright claims in Anglo-American copyright law, it develops a 
theoretical basis for understanding the workings of these claims and offers a 
framework for courts to deploy in adjudicating them, which addresses the 
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concerns about free speech and censorship that have contributed to the ignominy 
that privative copyright claims continue to encounter in modern copyright 
jurisprudence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
U.S. copyright law is justified today in exclusively utilitarian 
terms. Drawing from the constitutional directive that copyright exists 
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”1 courts, scholars, 
and legislators identify copyright’s primary purpose as the inducement 
of creativity. According to this theory, which has in recent times 
assumed an overt economic orientation, copyright’s promise of limited 
market exclusivity over original expression functions as an ex ante 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
        
2020] PRIVATIVE COPYRIGHT 3 
incentive for the production of such expression.2 By promising authors 
a set of marketable exclusive rights in their works, copyright is believed 
to incentivize the production of works of authorship. Copyright’s very 
raison d’être is therefore seen to lie in its role as a market-based 
incentive for creative production.3 
Yet in practice, copyright does much more than just induce 
creativity through the market. Ever since its origins, copyright law has 
seen a robust set of infringement claims being brought that have no 
connection whatsoever to the market. These are not just infringement 
claims that lack a market basis owing to the creator’s unique 
circumstances; they are instead claims that are motivated by decidedly 
nonmarket considerations. Rather than seeking to curb competition for 
the production and dissemination of the work, these claims are brought 
by authors and are driven by the desire to prevent any distribution of 
the work because of the noneconomic harm that such dissemination is 
likely to cause them. These claims are best described as “privative” 
claims since they involve the author seeking to legitimately suppress 
the publication of expression that is her own creation. 
Paradigmatic of privative copyright claims are actions brought 
to prevent the public distribution of work consisting of content that its 
author does not want revealed publicly and that, on its face, discloses 
its author’s identity. In these situations, the publication (or 
distribution) compels the author to publicly accept authorship of the 
work against her own will. In so doing, it produces a form of dignitary 
harm that melds considerations of privacy, personality, and autonomy. 
The earliest privative copyright claims arose in relation to 
private letters, which copyright law came to treat as protectable literary 
works.4 Implicit in this early treatment was the recognition that while 
letters did contain literary expression, the rationale for affording them 
protection was nevertheless different. These private letters entailed 
their authors recording private and potentially embarrassing content, 
all of which could be readily associated with them, and which the 
 
 2. For scholarly work either pushing this idea or assuming its centrality to copyright law, 
see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1576–81 (2009); William. W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1702 (1988); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-
Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996); and Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public 
Goods Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 643 (2007). 
 3. Cf. Stewart Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1198 
(1996) (arguing that the justification is more rhetorical than real).  
 4. See discussion infra Section III.A (discussing privative copyright claims under early 
English law).  
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authors fully intended to keep out of public circulation.5 From there, the 
idea expanded to cover other—similarly private—works. Ironically, 
despite this expansion, copyright law has never carved out a special 
place or category for such works within its overall skein, so they 
continue to be analyzed and theorized using copyright law’s traditional 
principles and assumptions. 
A recent use of copyright law to address the issue of revenge 
pornography illustrates this expansion in a modern context.6 The 
Plaintiff in the case had taken intimate photographs of herself and 
shared them with the Defendant, her boyfriend at the time.7 When their 
relationship soured, the Defendant began publicly distributing those 
photographs—without her consent—in an effort to humiliate her.8 The 
work thus embodied sensitive content and simultaneously risked 
revealing the identity of its subject and creator. The Plaintiff thereafter 
promptly registered the work and commenced an action against the 
Defendant for copyright infringement, which culminated in her 
obtaining a permanent injunction enjoining the distribution of the 
images as well as a large damages award.9 As should be obvious, 
copyright’s market rationale played no role in the Plaintiff’s creation of 
the work nor in her infringement claim. Instead, the claim was driven 
by distinctively noneconomic considerations. Commentary and 
coverage examining the case have uniformly agreed with the outcome, 
but nevertheless doubted the suitability of employing copyright to this 
end.10 The rationale for the supposed mismatch originates in the view 
that copyright law ought to be invoked only when the creative incentive 
(and its connected market attributes) is at issue, and not otherwise. 
 
 5. For an early and insightful treatment of the idea, arguing that copyright should recognize 
a role for privacy interests, see Jon O. Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, 12 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 459, 466–67 (1988). 
 6. See Doe v. Elam, No. 2:14-cv-09788-PSG-SS (C.D. Cal., Apr. 4, 2018), ECF No. 139-1 
(granting default judgment against Defendant). 
 7. Id. at 2.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 6–9. 
 10. For coverage of the case, see Christine Hauser, $6.4 Million Judgment in Revenge Porn 
Case is Among Largest Ever, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/04/11/us/revenge-porn-california.html [https://perma.cc/S6KZ-UMRH]; Max Jaeger, The 
Ingenious Way Revenge Porn Victims are Fighting Back, N.Y. POST (Apr. 11, 2018, 9:25 PM), 
https://nypost.com/2018/04/11/the-ingenious-way-revenge-porn-victims-are-fighting-back/ 
[https://perma.cc/B5ZC-V3KF]; Sara Ashley O’Brien, Woman Awarded $6.45 Million in Revenge 
Porn Case, CNN (Apr. 9, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/09/technology/revenge-
porn-judgment/index.html [https://perma.cc/QQ4Q-LJWC]. As an example of this skepticism, see 
Erica Fink, To Fight Revenge Porn, I Had to Copyright My Breasts, CNN (Apr. 26, 2015, 1:32 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2015/04/26/technology/copyright-boobs-revenge-porn/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/3NUN-4DP8] (describing the use of copyright as an “extreme” and “creative” 
solution, while mischaracterizing the very subject matter of copyright protection). 
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This perceived mismatch arises from a myopic understanding of 
copyright law and its normative ideals. Contrary to common wisdom, 
the use of copyright in revenge pornography cases is but a modern 
addition to the (implicit) category of privative copyright claims. 
Protecting the author’s dignitary interest and the underlying 
commitment to authorial autonomy that motivates these claims have 
remained important normative goals of copyright law despite the 
multiple doctrinal variations and updates that the law has gone 
through over the last three centuries. Publication, which had long been 
seen as copyright’s principal analytical device for protection, is 
routinely conceived of in entirely commercial terms. This exclusive 
focus on the commercial aspects of publication ignores the complex set 
of noneconomic factors that motivate an individual’s decision of 
whether, when, and how to embrace the identity and title of “author”—
a decision that lies at the root of privative copyright claims. 
Affording authors a mechanism of private redress for 
interferences with their authorial autonomy has always been central to 
copyright doctrine. And yet, modern American copyright thinking 
exhibits a marked reluctance to acknowledge this as a legitimate goal 
for copyright law, preferring instead to relegate all noneconomic 
interests to the domain of moral rights. Generally speaking, Anglo-
American authorial interests are today classified into two broad 
categories—known as the “dualist” model of copyright.11 On the one 
hand are the creator’s economic interests, believed to be protected 
entirely by copyright’s set of marketable exclusive rights.12 And on the 
other are the creator’s authorial interests, served by inalienable “moral” 
rights—rights that are taken to protect the creator’s reputational 
interests as manifested in the work.13 Not only are these two categories 
treated as mutually exclusive, but they are also considered exhaustive 
of the kinds of interests involved. In other words, the category of moral 
 
 11. See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in 
United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 21–23 (1994) 
(describing the development of the dualist theory, notable proponents of the theory, and its basis 
in the French Copyright Act of 1957); Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformation of 
Moral Rights, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 74 (2007) (describing the dualist theory and the differences 
between it and monist approaches). As Rigamonti argues, the distinction is hardly watertight and 
most jurisdictions exhibit some overlap in practice. Rigamonti, supra, at 75–77. 
 12. Rigamonti, supra note 11, at 99. 
 13. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 355 (2006) 
(describing the moral rights theory of copyright protection as recognizing that authors have 
“inalienable rights in their works that protect their moral or personal interests”); Martin A. 
Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. 
L. REV. 554, 557 (1940) (discussing and exemplifying the differences in economic and moral 
protections in copyright law).  
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rights is routinely treated as the exclusive (if not principal) basis for 
protecting the creator’s noneconomic interests.  
As understood by U.S. law today, moral rights do little to protect 
the interests involved in privative claims.14 They protect authors 
against harmful mutilations of the work and wrongful attributions of 
authorship. To the extent that they serve the reputational interests of 
authors, they only ever do so for the author’s reputational interests as 
embodied in the work, and never independently.15 While the interests 
at issue in privative claims emanate from the distribution and display 
of the work, those interests are hardly embodied within the work itself. 
The work is instead the principal means through which the expressive 
harm is inflicted; yet the harm manifests itself well beyond the four 
corners of the work.  
What justifies the persistence of privative claims within 
copyright is the reality that the root of these claims is in an important 
sense authorial, despite implicating other concerns. The work involved 
in a privative claim very much originates with the creator and assumes 
a uniquely personal status to its creator owing to its content, which is 
subjectively personal to the author. The content of the work comes to be 
indelibly tied up with the identity of its creator in a way that renders it 
impossible to extricate the two in dealing with the work. Disseminating 
the work against its creator’s wishes therefore amounts to a denial of 
authorial autonomy, not just as an infraction of authorial control over 
the work, but additionally in the sense of compelling its creator to 
accept a set of responsibilities and consequences, as author, against her 
will. And unlike with moral rights, the interference with the author’s 
autonomy occurs not through any harm to the work, but quite 
distinctively instead through the work. Safeguarding the author’s right 
to exclude others from the work is therefore the essence of privative 
claims.  
Appreciating the significance of privative copyright claims 
necessitates recognizing that in its most basic form, copyright law 
functions by rendering forms of expressive harm (that is, harm arising 
from acts of expression) privately actionable. The primary form of 
expressive harm that copyright ordinarily centers around is 
 
 14. Limited moral rights are today codified in the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
As discussed later, moral rights protection remains more expansive in civil law countries, where 
aspects of privative claims would find protection under the right of disclosure. See discussion infra 
Section II.C.  
 15. The legislative history accompanying the enactment of the U.S. moral rights law makes 
this abundantly clear. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6915, 6925 (noting that protection is limited to “artistic or professional honor or reputation of the 
individual as embodied in the work that is protected” (emphasis added)). 
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appropriative in nature—from instances of copying. Privative copyright 
claims have little to do with appropriative harm. The expressive harm 
at issue emerges instead from the mere dissemination or use of the 
protected work without the creator’s authorization, regardless of the 
objective utility or value of such actions. In this respect, it closely 
resembles other privative causes of action such as defamation, false 
light, and disparagement. And much like these other causes of action, 
privative copyright claims implicate free speech and First Amendment 
concerns directly.16 Unlike appropriative copyright claims, which 
implicate free speech concerns tangentially, privative copyright claims 
are by their very nature speech-impeding since their primary focus is 
on curbing the dissemination of protected expression, regardless of its 
market effects. Consequently, balancing these claims against free-
speech considerations becomes essential not just to safeguard speech, 
but also to ensure fuller recognition and legitimacy of privative 
copyright claims, which are today relegated to the shadows of the 
copyright system. 
This Article develops a theoretical framework to understand and 
analyze the working of privative copyright claims, which it argues 
remain an undeniable feature of the copyright landscape. It shows how, 
contrary to common wisdom, these claims are as old as copyright law 
itself and reveal the existence of a hitherto unappreciated source of 
normative pluralism within the copyright system. Drawing on the 
working of noncopyright privative claims, it then develops a mechanism 
for courts to differentiate legitimate privative copyright claims from 
mere attempts at censorship. 
Part I unpacks the basis of privative copyright claims. First, 
Section I.A examines how they seek to redress a particular form of 
copyright harm known as disseminative harm. Section I.B then 
analyzes the principal nature of harm that such claims involve, showing 
how they meld considerations of privacy, personality, and autonomy; it 
also traces the justificatory logic of such claims to the German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant. Part II then addresses the distinction 
between privative copyright claims and privacy claims. Section II.A 
first examines the principal arguments made in favor of using privacy 
torts to cover the interests at issue in privative copyright claims and 
demonstrates their flaws; Section II.B then examines the reasoning of 
the famous Warren and Brandeis article that formed the basis of the 
modern law of privacy to show how it misunderstood the working of 
 
 16. See Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1359–64 (1975) (analyzing the complexities 
of defamation law and free speech implications). 
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privative copyright claims; Section II.C concludes the Part by showing 
how privative copyright claims might be understood as simulating the 
working of a lesser-known moral right—the right of disclosure. Part III 
examines the evolution of privative copyright claims over time—first in 
early English law, then in early and nineteenth century American law, 
and finally under modern American copyright law. Finally, Part IV 
looks at the conflict between privative copyright claims and First 
Amendment concerns and develops a mechanism for courts to use in 
balancing the two while adjudicating these claims. 
I. THE BASIS FOR THE PRIVATIVE COPYRIGHT CLAIM 
The theory of creator incentives dominates U.S. copyright 
thinking today. A product of neoclassical economic thinking, this theory 
posits that creators or authors are rational actors who produce original 
expression based on the law’s promise of limited market exclusivity for 
such expression, once brought into existence.17 Market exclusivity—
produced through a prohibition on copying—is thus presumed to induce 
creative authorship and is seen as the principal justification for the very 
existence of copyright.18 
Despite its ubiquity and general acceptance, the incentives 
account of copyright law is hardly free of problems. To begin with, its 
universality remains dubious given that it is hardly premised on any 
empirical validation.19 Second, long-standing copyright law principles 
and doctrine have little connection to the incentives account, a rather 
anomalous situation.20 Despite recurrent calls to reform the system to 
reflect this putative alignment, copyright law has consistently rejected 
such modifications. And third, the incentives account readily presumes 
that the work at issue—the author’s original expression that is the 
subject of protection—is little more than a marketable commodity to 
that author. In other words, authorship is taken to be copyright’s 
mechanism for rent-seeking. 
Ever since its early days, Anglo-American copyright law has 
recognized a set of claims that have little connection to the logic of the 
market or creator incentives. In numerous situations, creators of 
original works of expression seek to have the work taken out of public 
 
 17. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 2, at 13; Balganesh, supra note 2, at 1576–81; Yoo, supra 
note 2, at 643. 
 18. See Yoo, supra note 2, at 648.  
 19. See Diane Leenheer Zimmermann, Copyright as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 
12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 30–34, 42–48 (2011).  
 20. See Balganesh, supra note 2, at 1581–89 (identifying the mismatch between copyright 
doctrine and the theory of creator incentives). 
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circulation when it is published or distributed without their consent. 
Their rationale for doing so has little to do with the market and is 
instead intricately connected to the nature and content of the work at 
issue, which for subjective reasons the author prefers to keep private. 
These claims are best described as “privative” copyright claims since 
they emanate from a distinctively expurgatory motivation—that is, 
they seek to prevent or redress the public dissemination of the work and 
are thus privational in structure. Copyright’s standard logic of economic 
value, market harm, and authorial incentives is far removed from these 
claims, which it has a hard time accounting for. This Part sets out the 
working of privative copyright claims and offers a justification for them.  
A. Disseminative Harm 
An indisputable reality of copyright law ever since its origins has 
been its structure as a private law claim. While often characterized as 
a form of “property,” in reality, copyright operates by granting creators 
(and owners) a private cause of action for certain kinds of unauthorized 
uses of their creative works.21 The core of copyright therefore lies in its 
active delegation of authority to creators for them to determine whether 
or when to commence an action for infringement, even when an 
unauthorized interference occurs. The decision about whether to 
commence an action for infringement is therefore entirely dependent on 
the creator-plaintiff’s rational motivations for the action.22 In essence, 
then, copyright functions as a form of civil redress. 
Despite its structure as a form of redress, the precise forms of 
harm that an action for copyright infringement is directed at remain 
multifarious. Owing to their focus on creative expression and the 
unauthorized use of such expression, actions for copyright 
infringement—as a class—aim to redress a form of harm within the 
broad category of “expressive harm,” or harm from expression. Here, 
copyright law is but one of several other types of private actions (some 
also privative) that are directed at expressive harm, such as 
defamation, false light, public disclosure of private facts, and false 
advertising. The specific type of expressive harm that copyright law 
aims to redress—best described as “copyright harm”—is also capable of 
being understood in different ways.  
 
 21. For a fuller elaboration of this idea and copyright’s normative structure as a private law 
institution, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1664 (2012). 
 22. For a general account of the rational motivation to commence a private law enforcement 
action, see SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 22–23 (2010).  
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The first, and most common, form of copyright harm emanates 
from acts of unauthorized copying and is best described as 
“appropriative harm.” Here, the harm ensues from the wrongful 
appropriation by the defendant of the plaintiff’s protected expression, 
which in turn produces either economic or noneconomic harm to the 
plaintiff. The economic harm is principally substitutionary in nature in 
that it interferes with the market for the original work and dissipates 
the creator’s revenue therein,23 while the noneconomic harm is 
associated with the idea that the appropriation is interfering with the 
creator’s ability to speak and is acting as a form of compelled speech.24 
Since the right to prevent unauthorized copying is often seen as 
copyright’s core—or gatekeeper—right, this form of harm is copyright’s 
most basic form of harm and is commonly (though mistakenly) taken to 
exhaust the category of copyright harm. 
A second form of copyright harm that the U.S. copyright system 
has recognized since 1990 originates in its limited recognition of moral 
rights protection in the form of the rights of integrity and attribution.25 
A common feature of both rights is that they derive from the need to 
protect the author’s reputation.26 In essence, therefore, they are 
directed at reputational harm. Yet the reputational harm is fairly 
unique in that it is limited to the author’s reputation as manifested in 
the work. The integrity right focuses on protecting against a mutilation 
or distortion of the work in the recognition that this would impact the 
authorial reputation directly.27 The attribution right focuses on 
ensuring that a work is not wrongly attributed to the author, and that 
the right work is accurately attributed to the author, again with the 
recognition that attributions contrary to the author’s actions and intent 
do harm to authorial reputation. And again, the principal focus of the 
 
 23. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related 
Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 332 (2005) (noting that “value to consumers depends on the extent 
to which a work has close market substitutes”); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product 
Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 217–18 (2004) (describing how the value of a copyright 
decreases as near substitutes enter the market). 
 24. The leading account here is by Abraham Drassinower. ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH COPYING? 111–44 (2015). Drassinower’s account is based on a Kantian theory of 
copyright, under which copyright seeks to protect the work in its capacity as a speech act rather 
than as an independent object. See id. at 112. For a review and critique, see Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, The Immanent Rationality of Copyright Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1047 (2017).  
 25. See Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 26. For a normative analysis of moral rights, identifying their purpose as protecting the 
creator against “reputational externalities,” see Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and 
Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 104 
(1997). 
 27. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3). 
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attribution is through the work.28 This form of harm is therefore best 
characterized as “in situ reputational harm” and, while noneconomic in 
character, it is nevertheless circumscribed by the need for the harm to 
emanate from an action to the work at issue and not independently. 
It is, however, a third category of often ignored copyright harm 
that forms the basis of privative copyright claims. This is the harm that 
inures to the creator from the dissemination of the work without the 
author’s consent or authorization. Ordinarily, discussions of 
unauthorized disseminations focus on the unauthorized distribution of 
unauthorized copies, and the resulting harm from such distribution is 
taken to be duplicative of the appropriative harm previously 
described.29 To the limited extent that it is seen as analytically distinct, 
however, it is taken to be a form of economic harm, ensuing from the 
substitutionary effect of the unauthorized distribution on the market 
for the author’s original (that is, authorized) copies of the work. The 
harm from distribution is therefore usually seen as parasitic on 
appropriative harm or limited to its economic consequences. 
An unauthorized dissemination can, however, do much more 
damage than just economic harm. In some situations, the dissemination 
is harmful not for its economic effects, but instead because of its 
interference with an author’s unique dignitary interest. Understanding 
how this dignitary interest emerges sheds light on the nature of 
disseminative harm. 
In various situations, individuals produce original expression 
that they intend to either keep private or limit to very particular 
recipients. This is often, though not exclusively, in the nature of private 
communications. And when fixed in a medium of expression, such 
communications become eligible for copyright protection.30 Given the 
private nature of such expression, individuals routinely inject into it 
aspects of their persona and individuality that they would almost 
 
 28. The attribution right has both a positive and a negative component. Hansmann & 
Santilli, supra note 26, at 130. The positive component entitles the author to be affirmatively 
named as the author of a work that she has created, while the negative component entitles the 
author to not be named as the author of a work that she did not author. Id. The negative component 
can therefore obviously be disaggregated from the author’s work itself, strictly speaking, and is 
therefore not operational through the work in the sense that the positive aspect is. Yet, it too 
operates through the work—albeit the misattributed work—insofar as it focuses on the connection 
(or put more precisely, the lack of connection) between author and work and thus may be 
accurately described as also protecting an interest of the author in the work: the interest not to be 
misidentified as author of the work. 
 29. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012) (giving copyright owners exclusive rights to distribute copies 
or authorize others to do so). 
30. See § 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which 
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”).  
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certainly refrain from revealing publicly. One might even put the point 
more strongly: it is indeed the private nature of the expression that 
induces its personality-infused content. When such expression is made 
public—after its production—it amounts to a direct infraction of its 
creator’s personal autonomy. Importantly, though, this infraction is 
two-layered. At its simplest, it repudiates the creator’s choice to control 
whether, how, and when the work is to be shared. Yet it also entails 
more than that, given the nature of the work involved. Publishing the 
work, or disseminating it publicly, forces the creator to admit to being 
the author of the work, since elements of the creator’s persona and 
identity are often apparent on the face of the work.31 The publication 
thus forces authorship on the creator, with all its social, legal, and 
moral implications.32  
The interest at the root of this scenario is thus a complex 
combination of elements of privacy, personality, and personal 
autonomy, best described as a “dignitary interest.” Most importantly 
though, the form of harm that its violation entails is in turn best 
described as “disseminative,” since it emanates from the mere 
circulation of the work without consent, tout court. Privative copyright 
claims attempt to redress disseminative harm. 
Central to disseminative harm is the recognition that the work 
is personal to its author in a rather distinctive way, which inflects the 
nature of the author’s autonomy at issue. The term “personal” may be 
used to exemplify a variety of different connections to the work, and 
thus requires some additional elaboration. An overwhelming number of 
privative copyright claims involve work wherein the individual author 
has presented herself in a particular way through the expression. Not 
only is the author’s identity readily apparent from the work, but 
additional aspects of the author’s individual persona are manifested in 
the original expression. Personal letters, selfies, diaries, intimate 
photographs, and videos—expressive work that is commonly the subject 
of privative claims—typify this manifestation, though it may occur in 
other, less direct ways as well. The work is therefore quite genuinely a 
work of authorship in that there is a salient causal connection between 
the creator and the expression at issue,33 but the particular content 
imbues that authorship with a subjectively personal dimension. This 
personal dimension has the effect of altering the nature of the author’s 
 
 31. IMMANUEL KANT, On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of Books, in 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 27, 29–35 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge 1996) (1785) 
[hereinafter KANT 1785]. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Causing Copyright, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10, 11–27 
(2017) (setting forth a theory of “authorial causation”). 
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work remaining unpublished.36 The 1976 Act eliminated this 
requirement and in its explication of the author’s exclusive rights, 
replaced the idea of publication with public “distribut[ion].”37 Instead of 
offering a clear definition of distribution, the Act merely defined 
“publication” in terms of distribution, which it then exemplified through 
specific forms.38 Simultaneously, it also abrogated almost all common 
law copyright for works that it covered, such as unpublished works, 
which became eligible for statutory protection.39 Additionally, authors 
of works were for the first time also given a new exclusive right—the 
display right—which allowed them to control the public display of the 
work, of particular importance to works that could not be disseminated 
except in their original, such as pictorial works and sculptures.40  
Consequently, unpublished works came to obtain copyright 
protection—including under the distribution and display rights—as 
long as they met the statute’s other criteria for protectability. By 
allowing unpublished works to be the subject of both distribution and 
display right claims (under § 106(3) and § 106(5) of the statute), 
copyright law today allows privative claims to be brought for both 
published and unpublished works without exception—though, of 
course, the nature of the disseminative harm and interest remain 
significantly stronger for the latter.41 This is certainly not to suggest 
that copyright infringement claims for the unauthorized dissemination 
of unpublished works are always privative claims; just that they can be, 
a reality that is often ignored. 
Discussions of copyright’s distribution and display rights focus 
on the economic harm that arises from unauthorized distribution or 
display of the work, principally in terms of its market effects. They 
ignore the simple reality that these rights are just as important for 
redressing noneconomic disseminative harm. The distribution and 
display rights, as they stand today and in the myriad forms that they 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012). 
 38. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
 39. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.01 (2018) 
(discussing the 1976 Act’s “virtual abolition” of copyright protection under the common law by 
federal preemption). 
 40. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). 
 41. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, at § 4.01[A]. This is not to imply that other 
rights—such as the reproduction right, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), the public performance right, see 17 
U.S.C. § 106(4), or the derivative works right, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(2)—are never implicated in 
privative copyright claims. To the contrary, they routinely are, especially given that plaintiffs have 
little to lose by pleading additional rights. It is just that the distribution right and the public 
display right most directly implicate the nature of concerns involved in disseminative harm, which 
relate to the public revelation of expression in a work that its creator seeks to shield from public 
scrutiny. 
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have taken over time,42 remain perfectly suited to redressing 
disseminative harm.  
The following examples illustrate the basic working of 
disseminative harms and (prima facie43) privative copyright claims 
under modern U.S. copyright law: 
• A maintains a personal diary that he never shows anyone, in which he records 
his candid observations of the world around him. It falls into the hands of B, 
who seeks to publish it without A’s permission. A can maintain an infringement 
action against B for violations of his § 106(3) public distribution right (and the 
reproduction right, under § 106(1)44). 
• M, a musician, produces an early version of a new musical composition that he 
is wary about. Before he can finalize it, he dies. The composition gets into the 
hands of a music publisher, P, who seeks to publish it. M’s heirs can bring an 
infringement action against P for violations of M’s public distribution right 
under § 106(3).  
• X sends Y a private email message, in which he sets out his views on various 
political subjects. In order to shame X, Y then forwards on the email to a public 
listserv group. X can maintain an infringement action for violation of his public 
distribution right under § 106(3). 
• P sends his doctor, D, a close-up photograph of his face for a diagnosis. He takes 
the photograph with his cell phone camera, and it shows a dark mole on his 
mouth that he is worried about. D treats it and later, without P’s consent, posts 
the picture on his public website as an example of the skin conditions that he 
has successfully treated. P can bring an infringement action against D for 
violation of his public display right under § 106(5). 
These examples all have a few things in common. Each 
infringement action is driven by nonpecuniary considerations. Instead, 
in each instance, the putative plaintiff seeks to curb the dissemination 
of the work, since it represents something personal to her. Part of what 
makes the work personal to the author in each case is the fact that the 
author’s identity is readily discernible from the face of the work. In most 
of the examples, identity is discernible as an objective matter; however, 
in one (the musician) it is at best subjectively discernible. As we shall 
see, privative copyright claims have evolved to encompass this 
 
 42. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 39, at § 8.11[A]. 
 43. These are only illustrations of a plaintiff’s potential prima facie case and do not cover 
potential defenses that a defendant might be able to raise—whether successfully or not—including 
fair use, implied license, and first sale. These are discussed later, in the context of understanding 
how courts should go about adjudicating privative copyright claims. See infra Section IV.B. 
 44. This is a prime illustration of the idea noted above, see discussion supra note 41, that 
privative copyright claims can implicate additional rights that are not themselves central to 
disseminative harm. In this illustration, publishing the diary involves making copies of it—which 
is a violation of the reproduction right. Yet if the publisher were to merely make copies and do 
nothing more, i.e., keep it locked up, it would clearly not produce the disseminative harm, for which 
distribution is essential. Thus for disseminative harm, the violation of the distribution right takes 
analytical precedence over violations of the reproduction right, even though as a purely legal 
matter there is no difference. 
        
16 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1:1 
subjectivity as well. In each instance, then, the work is not just an 
artifact for its creator; it is instead a representation of the author’s self. 
In short, privative claims attempt to redress a form of 
noneconomic copyright harm that is routinely ignored in modern 
discussions of copyright law—disseminative harm—and they do so 
primarily through the distribution right, and on occasion via the display 
right, even though they often implicate other rights. Disseminative 
harm is authorial in its roots and emerges from the strong dignitary 
interest that the creator has in the work. And while the claim is 
strongest for unpublished works, it by no means is limited to that 
category, except that the nature of the harm (and the corresponding 
interest) gets significantly attenuated when the author has voluntarily 
relinquished control over the work through publication or public 
distribution. 
B. Disseminative Harm as Compelled Authorship 
As discussed above, disseminative harm is strongly rooted in the 
ideas of personality and personal autonomy. Interestingly, a poignant 
and direct account of disseminative harm can be found in the work of 
German philosopher Immanuel Kant, considered to be the foremost 
philosopher to have theorized the nature and role of individual 
autonomy. 
Kant has long been associated with a highly nuanced and deeply 
influential deontological account of human autonomy.45 Kant’s moral 
and ethical philosophy on the topic has since been internalized into an 
account of legal rights by legal philosophers, which has spawned a 
voluminous body of scholarship.46 Initially, Kant’s accounts of property 
and private wrongs were often used by theorists of intellectual property 
 
 45. For some of Kant’s most important contributions to moral philosophy, see IMMANUEL 
KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Mary J. Gregor trans., Cambridge 1999) (1787); 
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood, eds. & trans., 
Cambridge 1999) (1781); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary 
J. Gregor & Jens Timmermann eds. & trans., Cambridge 2012) (1785); and IMMANUEL KANT, THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge 2017) (1797). 
 46. See, e.g., B. SHARON BYRD & JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, KANT AND LAW (2017); ARTHUR 
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2009); ERNEST J. 
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (2012); Peter Benson, External Freedom According to Kant, 
87 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (1987); George P. Fletcher, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, 22 
U.W. ONT. L. REV. 171 (1984); George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 533 (1987); Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 385 (1996); Thomas C. Grey, Serpents and Doves: A Note on Kantian Legal Theory, 
87 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1987); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. 
REV. 449 (1991); Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 1391 (2006). 
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to construct a nonutilitarian account of such rights.47 This approach 
prevailed until somewhat recently, when a relatively obscure stand-
alone essay by Kant directly on the subject of authors’ rights came to 
light.48 In this essay, Kant attempts to connect some of his thinking on 
autonomy and agency to the working of copyright, and yet he does so 
independently of property and ownership rhetoric.49 Instead, he 
appears to identify a version of disseminative harm as a core concern of 
authors’ rights. 
Titled On the Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication of 
Books, Kant’s essay purports to derive a basis for why copyright law 
treats the act of unauthorized publication as an actionable private 
wrong.50 Kant’s logic originates in the recognition that there is a 
fundamental difference between the ownership of the physical medium 
in which the work is expressed and the work itself.51 To Kant, the work 
is most fundamentally a communication, a “speech act,” on the part of 
the author.52 When a publisher prints a book, the publisher is in turn 
purporting to act on behalf of the author by communicating to her 
audience.53 In situations when this is authorized, the author is speaking 
to the public through the publisher.54 On the other hand, when 
publication is unauthorized, the publisher is purporting to speak on 
behalf of the author without the consent of the author—in turn forcing 
the author to speak against her own will, acknowledge the existence of 
the speech, and take responsibility for it.55 In this sense, the 
 
 47. See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 
DUKE L.J. 383 (1999) (justifying a right to publicity based in autonomy using Kantian philosophy). 
It is worth noting that in the German legal tradition, scholars appear to have been aware of Kant’s 
essay much earlier and they developed theories of copyright that came to influence the copyright 
regime in Germany. See Sig Strömholm, Copyright – National and International Development, in 
14 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: COPYRIGHT AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 
3, 10–11 (Friederich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1990) (discussing the role of Otto von 
Gierke in Germany’s copyright debates and noting his reliance on Kant’s essay to develop a 
personality-based, rather than property-based, justification for authors’ rights). 
 48. See KANT 1785, supra note 31, at 29–35. For leading attempts to rationalize the essay 
and employ it in theories of copyright law, see DRASSINOWER, supra note 24; Anne Barron, Kant, 
Copyright and Communicative Freedom, 31 L. & PHIL. 1 (2012); and Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, 
Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1059 
(2008). 
 49. See KANT 1785, supra note 31, at 29–30. 
 50. Id. at 27–29. 
 51. See id. at 33. 
 52. Id. at 35. 
 53. Id. at 32. 
 54. Id. at 30.  
 55. Id. at 31–32. 
        
18 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1:1 
unauthorized publication is therefore a form of “compelled speech,” 
which is the basis for its wrongfulness in Kant’s view.56 
Facially, Kant’s account may appear to be of little relevance to 
privative copyright claims. Privative copyright claims are primarily 
concerned with unauthorized distributions, whereas Kant’s focus is on 
reproductions. Additionally, Kant appears to limit himself to a category 
of works that bear a strong resemblance to speech, namely writings.57 
All the same, there remains an important continuity between Kant’s 
derivation and the logic of disseminative harm that becomes apparent 
as one digs deeper. 
At the core of Kant’s reasoning is the idea that publication and 
authorship are acts of communication, the latter direct and the former 
intermediated.58 The author’s autonomy is violated in an unauthorized 
publication—not mere reproduction—since the publisher is purporting 
to communicate on behalf of the author without authorization to do so. 
Where then does this leave an unauthorized dissemination of the kind 
at issue in privative copyright claims? 
Recall that the paradigmatic privative copyright claim remains 
a situation where the author of a work chooses to keep it private, or in 
very limited circulation. Indeed, under common law copyright, the work 
needed to be unpublished.59 Disseminative harm, described earlier, 
thus emerges principally in situations where a defendant engages in 
the act of “publication” or a “public display” of the work, without the 
authorization of its creator. And in so doing, the defendant is effectively 
compelling the creator of the work to assume responsibility for it as its 
author. 
The parallel between Kant’s account and privative claims now 
starts to become clear. Kant’s idea that forcing the author to speak each 
time there is an unauthorized republication of the work in the author’s 
name amounts to a form of compelled speech60 might be logically 
extended one step earlier in the chain of events. Forcing a creator of the 
expression at issue to speak at all and thereby assume the mantle of 
author and its attendant moral responsibilities and consequences is 
nothing less than an act of compelled authorship. And, insofar as it 
 
 56. See id. Kant himself does not use the phrase. The phrase is best known in the work of 
Abraham Drassinower, who builds a justification for copyright around Kantian thinking. See 
DRASSINOWER, supra note 24, at 111–44 (characterizing his analytical framework as “[a]dopting 
Kant’s framework”).  
 57. See KANT 1785, supra note 31, at 30.  
 58. See id. (describing publishers as controlling the speech of authors to readers).  
 59. See Laurence N. Walker, Publication and the Copyright Law Revision, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 
672, 674–76 (1962) (illustrating the rule that one who publicly presents an unpublished work 
retains his common law rights in that work). 
 60. KANT 1785, supra note 31, at 31–32. 
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forces an individual to assume responsibilities against her will, it is no 
less a denial of that individual’s agency and autonomy, which renders 
it just as wrongful in Kant’s deontological scheme and triggers an 
actionable private right. 
While this may seem like an extension of Kant’s logic in the 
essay to the case of disseminative harm, in reality Kant alludes to it 
later in the same essay. As he concludes his argument, all works of art 
are exempt from this analysis, because in Kant’s view, such works may 
be freely reproduced by anyone.61 His rationale for this is the 
uniqueness of artworks and the fact that once brought into existence, 
works of art—unlike literary works—assume a thinglike independence. 
As he puts it: 
This, then, is the reason that all works of art of another may be copied for sale to the 
public whereas books that already have their appointed publisher may not be reprinted: 
the first are works (opera), whereas the second are actions (operae): the former can exist 
on their own, as things, whereas the latter can have their existence only in a person. Hence 
these latter belong exclusively to the person of the author.62 
This is an intriguing observation that has received little 
attention even from scholars who have hitherto analyzed Kant’s essay. 
Kant appears to be suggesting that there is something “person[al]” 
about one category of works (writing) that is absent in another (art), 
and yet offers no real basis for this distinction.63 The basis for the 
distinction appears to be that books have a personal dimension 
associated with them since they always reveal the identity of their 
creator, which is rarely (or never) the case for works of art once brought 
into existence. This explains why book publishing is an act of speaking, 
since identity and content are indelibly bound up therein; this is not so 
with art. It traces back to the distinction between artifact autonomy, 
where the owner’s autonomy is entirely in the res (thing) at issue, and 
personal autonomy, where the autonomy (or its denial) directly 
implicates the individual’s own self. 
If this reading is correct, it has important implications for 
privative copyright claims, which almost always involve a personal 
dimension where the author has invested an identifiable element of her 
personality into the work. A good part of what triggers the injury 
associated with disseminative harm is the fact that the author is forced 
to self-identify as the creator of an expression that was intended to be 
kept out of circulation. This self-identification emanates from the fact 
that the work itself reveals the identity of its creator in some way. 
 
 61. Id. at 34–35. 
 62. Id. (emphasis added). 
 63. Id. 
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Privative claims therefore revolve primarily around works that entail a 
personal dimension in the sense that Kant identifies in his derivation—
letters, personal papers, diaries, and, in more modern times, “selfies,” 
for instance.64 
Kant’s deontological rationale in his 1785 essay thus provides an 
excellent justification for privative copyright claims and the 
disseminative harm that they are rooted in. Built around ideas of 
autonomy, communicative freedom, and private right, it in many ways 
works better as a justification for disseminative harm than for 
appropriative harm, the original target of Kant’s derivation. Authorship 
is a moral responsibility, in addition to entailing legal consequences. 
When this is foisted on an individual against her will, the denial of 
autonomy that it entails by purporting to substitute the individual’s 
agency for that of the disseminator produces the wrong that is privately 
actionable. 
II. DISSEMINATIVE HARM, PRIVACY, AND THE RIGHT OF DISCLOSURE 
While the dignitary interest that lies at the root of disseminative 
harm draws on considerations of privacy and personality, it is both 
analytically and normatively distinct from both ideas. Over the last 
several decades, privative copyright claims have come to be criticized 
rather extensively by scholars and courts on the basis that the interest 
underlying them is better protected through privacy claims. This 
approach misunderstands the nature of privative claims in copyright 
and the centrality of authorial autonomy that underlies them. 
This Part examines the  criticism of privative copyright claims 
and refutes it. It begins in Section II.A by examining the principal 
strands of the argument in favor of privacy (over copyright) as a 
mechanism of protecting dignitary interests. It then moves, in Section 
II.B, to unpacking the origins of privacy torts in American law and 
shows how the famous derivation of privacy logic by Warren and 
Brandeis consciously misstated several aspects of common law 
copyright as it existed at the time, and its protection for dignitary 
interests. Section II.C shows that the real analog of privative copyright 
claims in Anglo-American copyright law is a lesser-known moral right 
that is routinely invoked in civil law jurisdictions: the moral right of 
 
 64. A caveat is in order here. While the paradigm case of a privative claim involves work that 
readily identifies its creator, the category has since grown to encompass works where this element 
is more subjective. The next Part discusses this expansion of the category over time. As will be 
seen, a good part of the reason for this expansion appears to be courts’ implicit unwillingness to 
police the idea of authorial personality contained within the work. See infra Part III. 
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disclosure, which also focuses on disseminative harm, but with more 
limitations. 
A. Privacy Torts, Not Copyright 
Modern copyright scholarship is deeply critical of privative 
copyright claims; this criticism is premised on the argument that the 
dignitary interests and harms that underlie such claims are best dealt 
with through the law of privacy—specifically privacy torts—at the state 
level.65 This view has only grown since the passage of the new copyright 
statute and the elimination of common law copyright for most subject 
matter in 1976. Even the few scholars who are sympathetic to privative 
copyright claims describe them as an “emerging scenario”66 and do not 
go far enough in refuting the dominant view that “copyright is not the 
direct vehicle for the[ ] vindication”67 of dignitary concerns, since it risks 
converting authorship into censorship. The dominant view is driven by 
three primary concerns, none of which withstands close scrutiny: 
copyright utilitarianism, free speech concerns, and the perception that 
privacy torts are better suited to address dignitary harms. 
 
 65. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have 
Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 557–65, 587 (2015) (“[A]ssertions of protection for markets 
beyond the protected market—be they in relation to privacy and reputational interests or more 
generally—raise the specter of great cost to society.”); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Privacy, Copyright, and 
Letters, 3 ELON L. REV. 161, 163 (2012) (“In the context of copyright law, privacy is really 
something to be avoided.”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 
1130 (1990) (“[C]opyright law is grotesquely inappropriate to protect privacy and obviously was 
not fashioned to do so.”); Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing 
Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 16 (2016) (explaining that 
copyright is not the “direct vehicle” for advancing privacy interests); Alfred Yen, The Challenge of 
Following Good Advice About Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 
412, 413 (2016) (explaining that allowing a plaintiff to succeed on a copyright claim brought in the 
interest of personal privacy does not do much to protect the plaintiff’s incentive to create). But see 
Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1020, 1022 (2019) (arguing that 
copyright routinely protects noneconomic interests, including dignitary harms, but masks this 
protection in the language of the market); Deirdre Keller, Copyright to the Rescue: Should 
Copyright Protect Privacy?, 20 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 36 (2016) (finding such protection legitimate 
but suggesting that U.S. law recognize a moral right of disclosure).  
 66. Margaret Chon, Copyright’s Other Functions, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 364, 364 
(2016). It is worth noting that, overall, Chon appears to be sympathetic to the recognition of privacy 
and dignitary claims in copyright law. See id. at 366 (“Privacy and other functions of copyright 
should not be categorically excluded as beyond the legitimate purview of copyright’s concerns, and 
copyright will not be stretched beyond its breaking point by incorporating them.”). For a more 
recent account that is critical of deploying copyright for general privacy purposes, while 
nevertheless recognizing the existence of a few domains where such use might be legitimate, see 
Eric Goldman & Jessica Silbey, Copyright’s Memory Hole, 2019 B.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 67. McKeown, supra note 65, at 16.  
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1. Copyright Utilitarianism 
The principal reason for the extensive skepticism toward 
privative copyright claims emanates from the belief that copyright’s 
exclusive purpose lies in it serving as a market-based incentive for the 
production of creative works. Deriving from the seemingly 
instrumentalist wording of the Constitution and its mandate that 
copyright legislation strive to “promote . . . Progress,”68 this view roots 
all of the copyright system in the need to provide creators with an 
inducement to produce original expression through the market.69 
According to this view, since privative claims derive from a strong 
dignitary interest and since the creators at issue are unmoved by 
pecuniary considerations, copyright law ought to pay (little or) no 
attention to them. Infringement lawsuits brought exclusively to 
vindicate a dignitary interest—that is, lawsuits with no commercial or 
economic rationale—ought to be discouraged.70  
Accepting copyright’s utilitarian logic as its principal theoretical 
justification certainly does not necessitate denying the existence of 
other nonutilitarian normative values operating within the system. 
While normatively essentialist accounts of legal doctrines and 
institutions may present a degree of theoretical elegance in discussions 
of the system, they routinely fail to capture the practical machinations 
of legal doctrines and the complex behavioral motivations of the 
participants involved.71  
What such essentialist accounts also ignore is the simple reality 
that copyright doctrine—with the exception of one statutory 
provision72—shows no marked affinity for the utilitarian rationale as 
its dominant, let alone exclusive, justification. This has in turn allowed 
the facially neutral language of copyright doctrine to adapt itself to 
varying normative considerations over time, in precisely the same 
 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 69. See Balganesh, supra note 2, at 1576–77 (“Copyright law is thus thought to exist 
primarily to give authors (that is, creators) an incentive to create and thereafter disseminate their 
works publicly.”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).  
 70. See McKeown, supra note 65, at 16 (“[C]opyright cannot be everything to everybody.”). 
 71. For what is perhaps the best known critique of this essentialism in academic legal 
theorizing involving law and economics, see Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some 
Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 458–59 (1974) (noting how the economic analysis 
of law underemphasizes the complexity of human behavior and is driven by an effort to avoid the 
“complexity” of the real legal system). 
 72. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012) (requiring courts to examine “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work” as part of the fair use analysis).   
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manner as the rest of the common law.73 Copyright’s infringement 
analysis is a prime example here, as is the joint works doctrine.74 
Therefore, while it may well be true as a normative and interpretive 
matter that today’s copyright thinking desires an exclusively utilitarian 
framing for the institution, this is hardly an essential attribute of the 
system such that deontological considerations, such as the author’s 
dignitary interest, have no place in it. 
In short then, the overt utilitarian turn in copyright law, which 
some see as emanating from the influence of twentieth century 
neoclassical economic thinking,75 is far from a principled reason to 
critique the legitimacy of privative copyright claims. To the contrary, 
normative pluralism has remained a hallmark of the copyright 
landscape, much like it has for a variety of legal institutions. Courts 
and scholars may find such pluralism messy and hard to theorize, yet 
in practice it has served copyright rather well over time. Privative 
copyright claims, as we shall see, predate copyright’s utilitarian turn. 
2. Free Speech Concerns 
  A second argument often raised against the use of copyright law 
to protect an author’s dignitary interests via privative claims is a 
concern with free speech, or the idea that authorship might be used as 
a vehicle for censorship. As an illustration of this concern, the recent 
case of Garcia v. Google, Inc.76 is often raised to show how the plaintiff’s 
nonpecuniary motives were little more than an attempt to squelch 
speech. Garcia involved a Plaintiff who, without her knowledge, came 
to be portrayed in a controversial and offensive motion picture, and 
thereafter sought to have the motion picture taken down from public 
viewing by arguing that she was the sole author of her individual 
performance in the work.77 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit denied her claim, but in so doing noted that her claim was of a 
dignitary nature, which was inappropriate for copyright law since it 
 
 73. For an account of how this might occur, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241 (2015). Jody 
Kraus has described a similar evolution in common law meaning as the process of “radical 
semantic evolution.” Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: 
A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 326 (2007).  
 74. For pluralist accounts of these doctrines, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity 
of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203 (2012); and Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned 
Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683 (2014). 
 75. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 
306–07 (1996) (“An approach to copyright based on . . . neoclassical and new institutional economic 
property theory has emerged as the principal theoretical support for copyright expansionism.”). 
 76. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 77. See id. at 737–38. 
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sought to suppress speech.78 The court echoed the idea that privacy was 
not the function of copyright law and noted: “We are sympathetic to her 
plight. Nonetheless, the claim against Google is grounded in copyright 
law, not privacy, emotional distress, or tort law, and Garcia seeks to 
impose speech restrictions under copyright laws meant to foster rather 
than repress free expression.”79 
The concern with free speech, seen in the court’s framing and 
elsewhere, is overstated. In some sense, there was nothing uniquely 
speech-suppressive in the Plaintiff’s argument in Garcia; nor did she 
seek a remedy different from that sought by any ordinary copyright 
plaintiff in a takedown action. Indeed, as scholars have pointed out, all 
requests for injunctive relief in copyright cases involve speech 
suppression as an analytical matter, and copyright has never had a 
problem with this reality as a matter of principle.80 Instead, courts have 
over time found ways and means to balance these competing concerns 
and incorporate them into the calculus for such relief.  
It is worth noting that the idea of free speech is a common 
rhetorical device that courts use to their advantage to justify outcomes, 
as seen in the Garcia opinion. In Garcia, the Ninth Circuit used it to 
deny relief.81 This is in contrast to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,82 where speech 
considerations were treated as overblown since copyright was itself “the 
engine of free expression.”83 At other times, courts have reiterated that 
copyright’s multiple safety valves—fair use, the idea/expression 
dichotomy, and the like—are sufficient to guard against any free speech 
concerns.84 Yet, the Ninth Circuit made no mention of this.  
Copyright has various devices protective of free speech that can 
come into play in privative claims. The most notable of these is fair use. 
Indeed, a scrutiny of various privative copyright claims indicates that 
in several such cases, defendants raise the defense of fair use, which 
courts use as a stand-in for free speech concerns and balance against 
the plaintiff’s claims.85 Given the robustness of these mechanisms, 
 
 78. See id. at 747 (describing the claim as a “classic prior restraint of speech”). 
 79. Id. at 737. 
 80. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165 (1998) (explaining that copyright injunction determinations 
are historically and presently pro-plaintiff). 
 81. 786 F.3d at 747.  
 82. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 83. Id. at 558. 
 84. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“[C]opyright law contains built-in 
First Amendment accommodations.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 758–61 (6th Cir. 2012); Monge v. Maya 
Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1170–83 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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there appears to be no credible concern that, as a principled matter, 
copyright protection for dignitary or privacy concerns risks converting 
authorship into censorship. 
3. Better Fit 
Courts and scholars also commonly dismiss any copyright 
protection for dignitary concerns with the argument that privacy law—
privacy tort law in particular—is a better fit for such concerns.86 Part 
of this objection has to do with the normative essentialism discussed 
previously and the belief that privative claims are hard to reconcile with 
copyright’s utilitarian basis. Relatedly, though, it also derives from the 
idea that privacy torts are better suited to protecting dignitary 
interests. It is this last point that deserves some additional attention. 
As noted earlier, the dignitary interest underlying disseminative 
harm and privative copyright claims entails more than just a concern 
with privacy. It implicates considerations of personality and personal 
autonomy, in the way of authorial autonomy. This is hardly an 
incidental feature of such actions—it is central to their existence. And 
the involvement of authorial autonomy adds a distinctive component to 
the action that takes it away from a mere concern with privacy. Courts 
routinely overlook this point.87  
To fully appreciate this divergence, consider the difference 
between an intimate photograph taken by the person who is both the 
subject of the photograph and its author (the “selfie”), and an intimate 
photograph taken by a third party without the subject’s consent (the 
“paparazzi photo”). An unauthorized public distribution of the 
photograph is likely to be seen as troubling by the subject of the photo 
in both instances, but for similar yet qualitatively distinct reasons. 
With the paparazzi photo, both the creation and distribution of 
the photo are incursions on the subject’s ability to represent intimate 
details about himself or herself to the world in public. With the selfie, 
the creation is obviously not an issue, but its distribution is. Here, the 
 
 86. See, e.g., Garcia, 786 F.3d at 745 (“Privacy laws, not copyright, may offer remedies 
tailored to [Plaintiff’s] personal and reputational harms.”); New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry 
Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“An individual who seeks to protect the 
privacy of the content of private letters may do so by bringing suit under the right of privacy.”). 
 87. Indeed, they overlook this point even while granting a plaintiff’s claims. See, e.g., Monge, 
688 F.3d at 1168–73 (omitting any discussion of the Plaintiff’s status as author of the works at 
issue, even while finding in favor of the Plaintiff). Garcia, which is routinely—and wrongly—set 
forth as an example of a failed privacy or dignitary claim, involved a fundamental contest to the 
authorial status of the Plaintiff, which made it qualitatively different from a regular privative 
claim since the very existence of a valid authorial dignitary interest was thereby contested. See 
786 F.3d at 740–45.  
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distribution of the photograph certainly amounts to an interference 
with the subject’s self-representation to the world, but that interference 
is compounded by the representation of the subject’s own authorship to 
the public. In other words, what is harmful to the subject is not just a 
revelation of the intimate details contained in the photograph but also 
the disclosure of the subject’s own authorship of those details in the 
photograph. The two are inextricably bound up, rendering the selfie 
different from the paparazzi photograph. The subject-authored nature 
of the expression adds an important component to the nature of the 
concerns that the subject is likely to have, making it distinct in an 
important way from the nonconsensual paparazzi photograph.  
The fact that the subject authored the photograph himself or 
herself makes the harm from the unauthorized distribution more—
rather than less—significant, in that the subject-driven (and thus more 
authentic) nature of the creation is itself potentially more damaging to 
the author-subject. The photograph was created for one purpose, as 
determined by its author, yet used by the defendant for another. This 
act represents a denial of autonomy to the subject of the photograph, 
not just in her capacity as subject but more importantly in her capacity 
as subject-author, where the two cannot be disconnected.  
These two scenarios might be contrasted with a third where a 
professional photographer takes an intimate photograph of a subject 
with the subject’s consent (the “posed photo”). Now the subject of the 
photograph has no claim, be it in privacy or copyright, against the 
professional photographer because of the subject’s consent (in the case 
of privacy) and the photographer’s authorship and ownership of the 
work (in the case of copyright). If a third party seeks to make an 
unauthorized distribution of the photograph, the subject is now 
dependent on the photographer bringing the action.88 No considerations 
of authorial autonomy are implicated for the subject of the photograph. 
Should the subject (as transferee of the copyright) seek to bring a claim 
against the third party, it would be primarily as owner of the work—
based on the idea of artifact autonomy. The contrast between these 
three scenarios above serves to highlight how the dignitary interest 
underlying privative copyright claims functions. 
Privative copyright claims therefore involve a combination of 
representational and authorial concerns that are incapable of 
disaggregation. Privacy torts, most notably the tort of public disclosure 
of private facts, focus on representational autonomy and the 
 
 88. As was the case in Balsley. See 691 F.3d at 755 (“Plaintiffs sought ownership of the 
photographs so that they would have a legal means of ending the photographs’ dissemination.”).  
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individual’s ability to control public representations of her persona.89 
They view the denial of such autonomy as emanating from the subject’s 
choice to keep certain facets of her persona private, and then scrutinize 
the existence and parameters of that choice rather carefully. The 
nonconsensual public disclosure of such facts is seen to cast the subject 
into the public and in turn produce potential emotional and 
reputational harm. This analytical structure is ill-suited to situations 
where the subject exercises a critical role in the production of the 
content that is made public and then chooses to control whether and 
when to disseminate it. In these situations, the subject’s autonomy is 
not just about self-representation to the public but instead about self-
representation to the public as author. And this makes privative 
copyright claims a rather poor fit for privacy torts.90 Adjudicating such 
claims will involve addressing questions such as the appropriate scope 
of authorship, which privacy torts are unconcerned with. 
In summary, the claim that disseminative harm and its 
underlying deontological interest are better served through privacy 
laws does not withstand serious analytical and normative scrutiny. It 
instead emanates from an overly simplistic understanding of the 
interests involved in such claims, coupled with an exalted view of what 
privacy torts can cover. Indeed, hardly any scholar or court advancing 
the view that privacy law rather than copyright should be where these 
claims are brought has actually shown how privative copyright claims 
and the interests that they seek to vindicate might actually work under 
the tort of privacy. In the end, much of the argument appears to be 
driven by a desire to maintain a normatively coherent account of 
copyright law, which, ironically, contradicts the very evolution of the 
privacy/copyright divide. 
 
 89. The continued viability of this tort remains suspect, and scholars have long noted how its 
invocation is strongly disfavored. See, e.g., Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure 
Tort: A Historical Perspective, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171 (2010); John A. Jurata Jr., The Tort 
that Refuses to Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 489 (1999). 
 90. Indeed, there are aspects of privacy law doctrine that render it inapposite for privative 
copyright claims. If one considers the privacy tort of “public disclosure of private facts,” a rather 
fundamental requirement is that the content disclosed is “highly offensive to a reasonable person,” 
which is a largely objective determination. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(a) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977). This would eliminate a huge swath of privative copyright claims that are hardly 
offensive on their face, but nevertheless remain an affront to the dignitary interest of the author. 
Additionally, the tort’s concept of “public disclosure” does not track the concept of “publication” 
such that private or semiprivate communications that are not accessible by members of the public 
are unlikely to qualify as violations. See id. § 652D cmt. a (“ ‘Publicity,’ on the other hand, means 
that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons 
that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.”). 
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B. Warren and Brandeis and the Privacy/Copyright Conflation 
As discussed above, courts and scholars routinely take the 
position that while privacy and dignitary interests are legitimate and 
deserve some protection, they are nevertheless not relevant to copyright 
and its purposes.91 The criticism is closely tied to the independent 
development and flourishing of “privacy torts,” private causes of action 
under state law that purport to protect a plaintiff’s reputational, 
personal, and emotional interests against invasion by defendants.92 The 
origin of these privacy torts is commonly traced to a seminal article 
penned at the end of the nineteenth century by Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis, wherein they articulated a rationale and analytical 
basis for the common law to develop an independent set of actions for 
privacy.93 Consequently, their argument is seen today as the basis for 
excising personal, dignitary considerations from copyright and 
quarantining them into the independent category of privacy torts.  
The Warren and Brandeis argument, however, betrays an 
important irony. In developing their logic and reasoning for the 
protection of privacy—or the “right to be let alone,”94 as they put it—
Warren and Brandeis make an important move that scholars writing 
about the copyright/privacy interface overlook or underplay. Warren 
and Brandeis base the entirety of their reasoning on copyright law as it 
worked at the time, specifically on the extant protection that 
nineteenth-century copyright law afforded disseminative harm through 
privative claims for infringement. Warren and Brandeis make the 
entire premise of their article abundantly clear fairly early on, with the 
observation that “the legal doctrines relating to infractions of what is 
ordinarily termed the common law right to intellectual and artistic 
property are, it is believed, but instances and applications of a general 
right to privacy, which properly understood afford a remedy for the evils 
under consideration.”95 In attempting to derive the logic for an 
independent right to privacy, the article goes to some length to attempt 
 
 91. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 65 at 1130 (“[C]opyright law is grotesquely inappropriate to 
protect privacy and obviously was not fashioned to do so.”). Judge Leval took the same position in 
one of his opinions addressing the question at the district court level. See New Era Publ’ns Int’l, 
695 F. Supp. at 1504 (“It is universally recognized, however, that the protection of privacy is not 
the function of our copyright law.”). 
 92. See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805 (2010); 
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
 93. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 198. 
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to undermine the legitimacy of privative claims and disseminative 
harm within copyright. Yet its reasoning to this end is spurious. 
As noted above, Warren and Brandeis locate the general logic of 
privacy within the domain of copyright, specifically within common law 
copyright, since statutory copyright at the time did not apply to 
unpublished works, a distinction that has since been abrogated. They 
then set out the core of their argument with the following description of 
copyright protection and privative claims: 
The existence of this right [i.e., copyright] does not depend upon the particular method of 
expression adopted. . . . Neither does the existence of the right depend upon the nature or 
value of the thought or emotion, nor upon the excellence of the means of expression. . . . 
In every such case the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be 
given to the public. No other has the right to publish his productions in any form, without 
his consent. . . . The right is lost only when the author himself communicates his 
production to the public . . . . [T]he common-law protection enables him to control 
absolutely the act of publication, and in the exercise of his own discretion, to decide whether 
there shall be any publication at all.96 
If copyright law at the time covered what they were advocating, 
what then was the basis for taking it out of copyright, and into a distinct 
cause of action? For them, the answer lay in copyright’s supposedly 
mistaken reliance on the notion of “property.” They thus argue: 
But where the value of the production is found not in the right to take the profits arising 
from publication, but in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the ability to prevent 
any publication at all, it is difficult to regard the right as one of property, in the common 
acceptation of that term. . . . [T]he protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in 
preventing publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right 
of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right 
not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be 
defamed. . . . The principal which protects personal writings and all other personal 
productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any 
form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate 
personality.97 
As support for this observation, they cite to a leading nineteenth-
century copyright law treatise, which merely notes that the term 
property as applied to privative claims was “an expression perhaps not 
quite satisfactory, but on the other hand sufficiently descriptive of a 
right which, however incorporeal, involves many of the essential 
elements of property, and is at least positive and definite.”98 They then 
rather hastily surmise that the primary reason that the law had been 
 
 96. Id. at 198–200 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 97. Id. at 200–01, 205 (footnotes omitted). 
 98. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS, DRAMATIC 
AND MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS, LETTERS AND OTHER MANUSCRIPTS, ENGRAVINGS AND SCULPTURE, 
AS ENACTED AND ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA; WITH SOME NOTICES OF THE HISTORY 
OF LITERARY PROPERTY 94 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 2005) (1847). 
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using the term “property” for these claims was in order to make the 
entitlement applicable against the world at large—that is, in rem—
citing to the landmark copyright case of Folsom v. Marsh, which 
involved a dispute over the publication of George Washington’s 
collected letters.99 Warren and Brandeis argue that Justice Story’s 
adoption of the property idea for copyright in that case was in order to 
overcome the notion of privity that would have precluded an action for 
breach of an implied contract.100 Yet a close reading of the opinion 
hardly suggests this motive but instead merely indicates that Justice 
Story recognized the ability of the owner to go after third parties not in 
privity as a consequence of such ownership.101 
What their analysis misses is the reality that by the nineteenth 
century, common law copyright—or indeed all of copyright—no longer 
needed to be characterized as “property” for its in rem nature to be 
accepted. While courts and scholars did continue to refer to copyright 
as “literary property,” the act of unauthorized copying had quite 
independently come to be understood as an injurious wrong analogous 
to a regular tort that allowed an action to be brought against third 
parties independent of a contract.102 To the extent that courts deployed 
property language, it is fairly obvious that they were doing so as part of 
their dicta and for largely expository—rather than analytical—
purposes. 
Nevertheless, by emphasizing the connection between copyright 
claims and the idea of property, Warren and Brandeis were making an 
implicit analytical move that proved to be influential. And this was the 
 
 99. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
 100. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 93, at 211 (“Thus, the courts, in searching for some 
principle upon which the publication of private letters could be enjoined, naturally came upon the 
ideas of a breach of confidence, and of an implied contract; but . . . this doctrine could not afford all 
the protection required . . . .”).  
 101. Justice Story thus observes: “The general property in the manuscripts remains in the 
writer and his representatives, as well as the general copyright. A fortiori, third persons, standing 
in no privity with either party, are not entitled to publish them, to subserve their own private 
purposes of interest or curiosity, or passion.” Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 346. His use of the term “a 
fortiori” clearly implies the identification of a consequence rather than a cause, contrary to what 
Warren and Brandeis claim. 
 102. As an example, consider the 1834 Supreme Court case of Wheaton v. Peters. 33 U.S. 591 
(1834). Wheaton was the first copyright case decided by the Court and centered on the existence of 
common law copyright after the enactment of the federal copyright statute in 1791. See id. at 592. 
What is interesting to note, however, is that even though the Court (and the litigants) use property 
rhetoric in the case, the action itself was brought using an “action on the case,” id. at 596, a writ 
that had developed to conflate the distinction between property and personal actions, and had 
come to recognize that the existence of a property interest could be secondary to the existence of 
an injurious wrongdoing by the defendant. See Keeble v. Hickeringill (1707) 103 Eng. Rep. 1127; 
see also Elizabeth Jean Dix, The Origins of the Action of Trespass on the Case, 46 YALE L.J. 1142 
(1937). 
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idea that property implied an economic motivation, which privative 
copyright claims lacked, in contrast to more standard pecuniary 
copyright claims. The idea of property thus served to drive a wedge 
between standard (meaning economic) copyright claims and privative 
copyright claims, with the latter then seemingly more aligned with 
other nonpecuniary causes of action. 
An additional reason for courts’ invocation of property in dealing 
with privative copyright claims—which Warren and Brandeis happily 
ignore—relates to the remedy that plaintiffs ordinarily sought in those 
cases, namely, an injunction. As is well known, equity allowed an 
injunction to follow whenever an entitlement was classified as a form of 
“property,” an artificial classification that came under criticism fairly 
early on and was eventually repudiated.103 The early privative 
copyright cases, many of which Warren and Brandeis rely on,104 
routinely lean on this distinction in invoking their equitable jurisdiction 
in favor of plaintiffs. The characterization of the copyright entitlement 
as property had little analytical basis and was therefore a unique 
product of equity’s own rigidity. None of this, of course, mattered to 
Warren and Brandeis. 
Given their explicit agenda, which was the identification and 
derivation of an independently protectable privacy interest in the 
common law, Warren and Brandeis had little need to be cautious in 
their characterization of these past copyright cases and the language 
therein. In relying on the emptiness of property language for their 
argument, they offer no independent understanding of property as a 
limiting idea to show that privacy is analytically (or normatively) 
distinct from property. Indeed, they equivocated in their own analysis 
by conceding that property may have meant little more than the right 
to exclude (as an in rem entitlement), in which case courts’ invocation 
of the idea for noneconomic harms might obviously seem less 
problematic.105 
Despite their reliance on common law copyright to derive the 
right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis do not once mention a central 
 
 103. For an early account of this distinction, see Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against 
Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640 (1916) (describing this position and 
criticizing it). 
 104. As a prime example, consider the case of Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 678; 
2 Swans. 403, 424–25 (emphasizing the nature of the copyright interest as property in order to 
validate an injunction). Warren and Brandeis refer to Gee, but completely overlook this aspect of 
the decision. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 93, at 200 n.3 (quoting the decision).  
 105. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 93, at 213 (“[T]he rights, so protected, whatever their 
exact nature, are not rights arising from contract or from special trust, but are rights as against 
the world; and, as above stated, the principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in 
reality not the principle of private property . . . .”).  
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feature of all the privative copyright claims that they rely on: namely, 
that the action in each case was brought by the author of the work, 
rendering it functionally a personal claim and throwing direct focus not 
just on the representational issue but also on authorial autonomy. 
Emphasizing the authorial aspect of privative copyright claims would 
have perhaps undermined their case for a standalone right to privacy; 
nevertheless, given the centrality of authorship as a normative matter 
to those claims, its omission is stark.  
Despite all of this, the Warren and Brandeis article had the 
effect of influencing state courts in the creation of privacy torts.106 In 
this development, though, courts seem to have paid scant attention to 
the possibility of copyright—common law or statutory—offering 
plaintiffs a more efficacious remedy in certain situations, given its 
structure as a strict liability action and the statute’s provision of rather 
direct and clear remedies, including statutory damages. The main 
indirect effect over time was simply that these claims, which had once 
been a legitimate part of copyright jurisprudence, eventually came to 
be seen as palpably illegitimate within copyright.107 Copyright law’s 
eventual utilitarian turn only served to solidify this view and build on 
the property/nonproperty logic that the Warren and Brandeis article 
put forth. 
Even if Warren and Brandeis are seen to have made a 
compelling argument for the development of independent privacy torts 
and the existence of a “right to privacy,” nowhere does their analysis 
recommend eliminating the personal claims that they identify from the 
ambit of copyright law. To the contrary, insofar as they identify 
copyright law to be a subset of a general action to protect individual 
privacy, they seem to imply the continuing legitimacy of such claims 
under copyright.108 While this may not be true for privacy claims that 
involve neither authorial subject matter nor original expression, it is 
certainly the case for material that involves one or both of these 
elements. And yet, scholars have read the Warren and Brandeis article 
as recommending a dramatic reduction in copyright’s scope, in 
furtherance of a right to privacy.109 
 
 106. For an early discussion of this influence by 1960, see Prosser, supra note 92, at 384–89. 
 107. So much so that by 1985, the Supreme Court noted that “[i]t is true that common law 
copyright was often enlisted in the service of personal privacy,” reversing the order that Warren 
and Brandeis had identified in their argument. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985). 
 108. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 93, at 195–98 (discussing copyright law as “the next 
step which must be taken for protection of the person”). 
 109. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and 
Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 654–55 (1991) (“Because they desired to construct a 
right of privacy that extended protection to an entire inviolate personality and not just to its 
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What is also perplexing, though perhaps an unremarkable 
reality of its era, is that the Warren and Brandeis article offers no 
normative justification for treating privacy claims as a separate cause 
beyond a formalist treatment of the property idea. Nor does it offer any 
structural or procedural reasons for it. To the contrary, it disregards 
the possibility of there being strong normative reasons for retaining 
these claims (at least partially, if not wholly) within copyright law—
reasons deriving from the ideas of authorship and authorial autonomy 
discussed previously. 
As Warren and Brandeis see it, disseminative harm is the very 
basis of the right to privacy. While they may be right to see in it 
elements of the need “to be let alone,” they altogether disregard the 
centrality of authorship and self-expression in instances of such harm, 
which formed the very basis for copyright’s inclusion of such harm 
within its overall ambit. Much of their analysis is strongly persuasive 
when it involves informational claims that do not involve original 
expression or implicate third-party nonauthor plaintiffs.  
Contrary to much of today’s accepted wisdom, then, the right to 
privacy does not exhaust the gamut of claims and interests that 
plaintiffs have over personal content. The intellectual lineage of the 
Warren-Brandeis argument and their disaffection for the analytical and 
normative basis of privative copyright claims on which they based their 
entire analysis aptly reveal this point. The expanding domain of privacy 
law coupled with the utilitarian turn in copyright have only served to 
allow their argument to flourish, while ignoring the reality that 
disseminative harm is a distinct form of harm within the panoply of 
legitimate copyright harms. 
C. Simulating (and Enlarging) the Moral Right of Disclosure 
While privacy torts may thus be an imperfect home for the 
dignitary interest involved in privative copyright claims, there is 
nevertheless a cause of action recognized in some countries that 
presents a closer analog: the moral right of disclosure.  
Until the year 1990, federal copyright law consciously distanced 
itself from providing authors with “moral rights,” a set of rights that 
 
products, Warren and Brandeis believed that they were forced to dismantle the property law 
structure of common law copyright.”). But see Pamela Samuelson, Protecting Privacy through 
Copyright Law?, in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 191 (Marc 
Rotenberg et al. eds., 2015) (analyzing the privacy/copyright connection in the Warren & Brandeis 
article and, unlike other scholars, remaining equivocal about allowing copyright to retake some of 
the domain that has been excised from it in the name of privacy). 
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have long been recognized and protected in civil law jurisdictions.110 
Premised on the idea of ensuring respect for the work and the author’s 
connection to it, these rights are seen as emanating from the very act of 
authorship, inalienable and functionally distinct from copyright’s 
exclusive economic rights.111 Of the myriad moral rights recognized in 
these jurisdictions, the attribution right and the integrity right remain 
the best known—and are indeed the only moral rights that are today 
recognized at the federal level in the United States.112 A right that is 
infrequently invoked, yet of some significance, is the right of disclosure. 
The right of disclosure protects the author before her work is 
released publicly. Until the author is ready to divulge or disclose it 
publicly, the right allows her to prevent any dissemination of the work 
against her wishes.113 As a corollary, it also allows the author to prevent 
its dissemination if she chooses to abandon or discard the work without 
publicly distributing it. Essential to the operation of the right is that 
the work be deemed incomplete by the author.114 In essence, therefore, 
it is directed at protecting the creative process and the author’s 
autonomy and control over deciding when that process has terminated 
and when the work is ready for release to the public—in other words, 
the decision of when to become an author. 
Upon joining the Berne Convention in 1989, Congress decided to 
accord authors some minimal form of moral rights protection in the 
United States, through the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.115 It did 
so by recognizing the rights of integrity and attribution, the only rights 
 
 110. For a general overview of moral rights protection, see MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL 
RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 31–110 (2011); Arthur S. Katz, The 
Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law—A Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 75 (1951); 
and Rigamonti, supra note 13. 
 111. See RAJAN, supra note 110, at 7 (explaining that notions of “the author as an independent 
creator” coincided with the rise of the moral rights doctrine). 
 112. See Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (explicitly granting these 
rights to “author[s] of a work of visual art”); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the 
Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985) (probing the 
relationship between the 1976 Copyright Act and moral rights). 
 113. See Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under 
French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 467–73 (1968); see also Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the 
Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 203–06 
(1995); Carl H. Settlemyer III, Note, Between Thought and Possession: Artists’ Moral Rights and 
Public Access to Creative Works, 81 GEO. L.J. 2291, 2329–44 (1993). 
 114. As one leading scholar of French law put it: 
So long as a work of art has not been completely created—of which the artist alone can 
be the judge—it remains a mere expression of its creator’s personality, and has no 
existence beyond that which he tentatively intends to give it. . . . He alone is able to 
determine when it should be disclosed, put into circulation, and treated as a chattel 
which may be exploited for profit. 
Sarraute, supra note 113, at 467. 
 115. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.  
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which the convention recognized.116 The legislative history of the 1976 
Act reveals that Congress was well aware of the disclosure right and 
made a conscious decision to avoid recognizing it in the statute at the 
time.117 Congress adhered to this position in 1990. 
Privative copyright claims operate as a substantial (if not 
complete) replacement for the moral right of disclosure.118 Even prior to 
the Act of 1976, common law copyright afforded authors protection for 
their unpublished creations, which was seen as doing the same work as 
the disclosure right.119 Indeed, in some respects the common law 
protection was broader insofar as it was not limited to incomplete 
works, unless of course the act of publication was seen as part of the 
completion. With the abolition of common law copyright for published 
works and the simultaneous elimination of publication as a prerequisite 
for federal copyright protection, privative copyright claims—based on 
the exclusive rights to publicly distribute and display the work—
operate as a full replacement for the disclosure right. In reality, post-
1976 claims go further than their common law equivalents in allowing 
for protection even when the work is fixed and published, but not 
publicly distributed or displayed.  
The revenge pornography example, discussed above,120 offers a 
useful illustration of this equivalence and indeed of the more protective 
nature of privative copyright claims. The victim of the unauthorized 
dissemination would not have had a claim under the moral right of 
disclosure, for two interrelated reasons. First, from the moment the 
picture was taken, it was complete; and second, it was indeed 
“disclosed” in some sense, even if only to the private recipient. By 
contrast, neither of these issues present obstacles to a successful 
privative copyright claim.  
Conversely, if one examines the most prominent continental 
cases where the moral right of disclosure was successfully invoked, it is 
apparent that they would each be sufficiently covered by the scope of 
 
 116. See id.; see also Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6 
bis, Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27 (1986), 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (amended Sept. 28, 1979) 
(affording authors certain moral rights protections).  
 117. William Strauss, Study No. 4: The Moral Right of the Author, in SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, 
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 
120–21 (Comm. Print 1961). 
 118. For an early recognition of this point, see James M. Treece, American Law Analogues of 
the Author’s “Moral Right”, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487, 493 (1968). For a recent argument advocating 
for the right in order to protect privacy interests in American copyright law, see Keller, supra note 
65, at 38. 
 119. See Treece, supra note 118, at 493 (comparing American “common law copyright” to the 
French “right of disclosure”). 
 120. See discussion supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text (discussing the use of copyright 
law to combat revenge pornography in Doe v. Elam). 
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modern privative copyright claims. These cases usually involve a 
familiar pattern.121 An artist enters into an agreement with a buyer to 
produce a work of art and then prior to the work’s completion, the artist 
either dies or abandons the project.122 When the buyer then chooses to 
display and distribute the work publicly, the author (or her heirs) 
successfully invokes the right of disclosure to prevent this from 
happening.123 In the United States, under post-1976 copyright law, 
these cases would all be covered by privative copyright claims—
emanating from the public distribution right, the public display right, 
or both. The buyer’s actions in each instance unquestionably amount to 
either a public distribution or public display which was not authorized 
by the artist, allowing for a successful claim. Consequently, privative 
copyright claims, especially after 1976, more than substitute for the 
lack of a moral right of disclosure in U.S. copyright law. 
Indeed, the normative logic for the existence of the right of 
disclosure in continental jurisdictions originates from the idea of 
avoiding disseminative harm to the author of the work. It stems from a 
trenchant commitment to authorial autonomy, a commitment that 
views the author or creator as the “master” of the work, with personal 
and potentially idiosyncratic preferences and choices that nevertheless 
deserve respect and serious validation in order to preserve such 
autonomy.124 Such is the strength of this right that even in situations 
where it would be objectively wasteful and meaningless to allow the 
right to be exercised (and for the work to be withheld from the public), 
the exercise of the right by an author is permitted in the interests of 
preserving such autonomy.125 In Anglo-American copyright systems, 
privative copyright claims afford authors nearly the same amount of 
protection against disseminative harm as the moral right of disclosure. 
 
 121. See Sarraute, supra note 113, at 467–73 (discussing the Whistler, Camoin, Rouault, and 
Bonnard cases). 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. at 467–68 (quoting Whistler v. Eden, Cour de cassation [Cass. 1e civ.] [supreme court 
for judicial matters] Seine, Mar. 14, 1900, D.P. 1900, I, 497, 500 (Fr.) as using this language to 
describe the artist’s control over the work). 
 125. This was the situation in the Camoin v. Carco case, where the artist had trashed his 
incomplete work of art, but a third party found it and sought to restore and display it, which 
resulted in the court siding with the artist and disallowing the third party’s actions despite the 
obvious wastefulness of this outcome. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Mar. 
6, 1931, D.P. 1931, II, 88, note Mast (Fr.).  
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATIVE COPYRIGHT CLAIMS 
Privative copyright claims are almost as old as Anglo-American 
copyright law itself. The logic underlying their functioning began to 
take shape shortly after the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710. In 
the three centuries since, they have mutated and adapted to society’s 
changing conceptions of privacy, personal autonomy, and copyright’s 
coverage of new subject matter. This Part describes the evolution of 
privative copyright claims since the early eighteenth century. Despite 
its shifting contours, copyright law has remained steadfast in its 
protection for the dignitary interest underlying these claims, a reality 
that is often forgotten in modern discussions of the subject. 
An examination of privative copyright claims over the years 
reveals three interrelated trends that are worth describing at the 
outset. First, fairly early on in the development of privative copyright 
claims, we see courts disavowing an objective verification of the 
dignitary interest involved—and the corresponding disseminative 
harm—and instead allowing the author to assert a subjective 
conception of the interest and corresponding harm from the defendant’s 
actions. This had the obvious effect of expanding the scope of privative 
claims. 
Second, in keeping with the move away from assessing the 
personal content of the work, we see courts occasionally justifying 
privative copyright claims using an inchoate labor theory of 
authorship.126 Unlike a Kantian approach based on authorial autonomy 
(and compelled authorship), the labor-based account enabled courts to 
focus on the process of authorship without having to examine or assess 
the product of that process—that is, the content of the work. 
Third, with the increased application of fair use to privative 
copyright claims under the 1976 Act, copyright jurisprudence has 
diluted the uniqueness and significance of the dignitary interest 
involved. Courts either translate—simplistically—the interest involved 
into economic terms, or they completely ignore the unique nature of the 
interest and operate using the formal language of the law that is 
outwardly agnostic to the nature of the interest at issue.  
 
 126. Inchoate only in the sense that it was never built into a fuller labor theory of ownership 
along the lines offered by some applying Locke’s theory to copyright. For applications of Locke to 
copyright, see Carys J. Craig, Locke, Labour, and Limiting the Author’s Right: A Warning Against 
a Lockean Approach to Copyright, 28 QUEENS L.J. 1 (2002); Jonathan Peterson, Lockean Property 
and Literary Works, 14 LEGAL THEORY 257 (2008); and Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: 
Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990). 
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A. Early English Law 
The earliest form of privative copyright claims involved private 
letters, which at the time were seen as embodying an individual’s most 
personal (and honest) statements about the world, meaning their 
unauthorized publication and revelation could produce more than just 
pecuniary harm. With the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710,127 the 
first Anglo-American copyright statute, it did not take long for a case 
involving private letters to make its way to court. The case was also one 
of the first ever copyright cases under the statute to be brought by an 
author, the new recipient of rights under the legislation.128 The case was 
Pope v. Curl, well known among copyright scholars and historians as 
the first case to hold that copyright protection subsists in letters, even 
when physical possession of those letters had been transferred to 
another.129 
Decided in 1741 by the Court of Chancery, Pope involved a claim 
by the famous poet Alexander Pope against a Defendant bookseller who 
sought to publish a collection of letters between Pope and the famed 
author Jonathan Swift.130 The extremely short opinion of just one page 
does little justice to the complexity of the case. As Mark Rose has 
documented, the case was in many ways a setup wherein Pope sought 
to manage his image “as a gentleman and a scholar rather than as a 
professional.”131  
When the Defendant in the case published Pope’s 
correspondence without his authorization, Pope made his argument for 
copyright infringement in personal rather than economic terms, 
arguing that such publication was a form of “betraying Conversation” 
and socially harmful.132 There appears to have been nothing 
particularly problematic or embarrassing in the content of the letters 
themselves, which Pope of course knew.133 This also pushed his legal 
argument in the case (made forcefully by William Murray, who would 
go on to become none other than Lord Mansfield, the noted copyright 
 
 127. Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 21 (Eng.) (repealed 1842). 
 128. See Mark Rose, The Author in Court: Pope v. Curll (1741), 21 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 197, 
197–98 (1992) (describing Pope as “an important transitional moment in the concept of authorship 
and author’s rights”). 
 129. See id. 
 130. See Pope v. Curl (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608, 608; 2 Atk. 342, 342. 
 131. Rose, supra note 128, at 202. 
 132. Id. at 203–04. 
 133. See id. at 202–05. 
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jurist134) in the direction of content neutrality by disentangling the 
unauthorized dissemination from its underlying content.  
The Defendant, however, sought to rebut Pope’s claim in two 
primary ways. First, on the question of property, he argued that the 
true owners of the letters were their recipients, rather than their 
authors.135 And second, he sought to refute the idea of content 
neutrality by claiming that the copyright statute was designed with 
literary works in mind, which these letters could not be fairly said to 
represent. The court’s decision responded to both points.136 
While acknowledging that the Statute of Anne was designed for 
“the encouragement of learning,” the court nevertheless refused to 
make a distinction between a book of letters and “any other learned 
work.”137 It offered no reason other than that such a distinction “would 
be extremely mischievous.”138 On the property question, the court drew 
a distinction between ownership of the physical letter and ownership of 
its content, noting that it was only the latter that authorized 
publication and which vested in the author.139 The opinion then 
returned to the question of the statute and offered some additional 
clarification on its conclusion that letters could obtain protection: 
It is certain that no works have done more service to mankind, than those which have 
appeared in this shape, upon familiar subjects, and which perhaps were never intended 
to be published; and it is this makes them so valuable; for I must confess for my own part, 
that letters which are very elaborately written, and originally intended for the press, are 
generally the most insignificant, and very little worth any person’s reading.140   
This is a peculiar but nevertheless important observation for our 
purposes. What the court is suggesting is that the very fact that the 
work at issue was intended to be kept private renders it in some ways 
more worthy of protection as a learned work—perhaps because it 
presents a more honest picture of the subject.141 What this observation 
and the overall opinion reveal is a court that is on the one hand 
unwilling to directly examine whether the Plaintiff suffered any specific 
 
 134. See Bernard L. Shientag, Lord Mansfield Revisited—A Modern Assessment, 10 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 345, 354 n.35 (1941). 
 135. Pope, 26 Eng. Rep. at 608, 2 Atk. at 342. 
 136. Id., 2 Atk. at 342–43. 
 137. Id., 2 Atk. at 342.  
 138. Id., 2 Atk. at 342.  
 139. See id., 2 Atk. at 342. 
 140. Id., 2 Atk. at 343. 
 141. The law of evidence adopts a similar position, which is perhaps what the court was 
alluding to. Modern evidence law considers contemporaneous written accounts of an event to 
represent an exception to hearsay and as such makes them admissible when the declarant is 
available to testify. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (setting forth the “Present Sense Impression” 
exception). 
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harm as a result of the publication, but on the other engaging with the 
question of protectability by trying to show how letters are themselves 
literary works in the spirit of that category. 
The observation is particularly noteworthy because it appears to 
be little more than dicta in the case, since Pope did not involve an 
unpublished work at all.142 Contrary to some prominent misreadings of 
the case,143 scholars have long noted that Pope involved the Plaintiff’s 
assertion of a statutory copyright claim on the basis of an authorized 
publication of the letters undertaken prior to the Defendant’s actions.144 
Pope was therefore not a privative copyright case strictly speaking, even 
though its observations about the value and protectability of letters 
offer a theory for analogous privative claims. 
Pope set forth the principle that letters were protectable subject 
matter under statutory copyright. And soon enough additional cases 
followed suit, most of which did indeed involve privative claims.145 And 
whereas the Plaintiff and court in Pope had refrained from addressing 
the objective content of the letters and the effects of its publication, later 
litigants became more willing to use the private and potentially 
embarrassing content of the letters to advance an objective view of the 
harm that would accrue from its publication.  
Perhaps the earliest privative copyright case was Thompson v. 
Stanhope, where the Plaintiffs were the executors of a well-known 
earl.146 Over the course of his lifetime, he corresponded extensively with 
his son and in these letters “drew the characters of persons, and wrote 
upon the subject of politics” in addition to a variety of other matters 
intended as instruction for his son.147 When his son died, the earl 
allowed the letters to remain in the possession of his widow, the 
 
 142. I am grateful to Professor Tomas Gomez-Arostegui for this point, and his generous 
assistance with the original archival materials from the case. 
 143. The misreading of the case is pervasive and extends to both judicial opinions and 
scholarly work examining the case. Much of the confusion appears to emanate from the manner in 
which Pope brought about the prior publication of his letters. For characterizations of the case as 
involving an unpublished work, see Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 842; Millar v. 
Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 221 & n.2; 4 Burr. 2303, 2340 & n.2; ISABELLA ALEXANDER, 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 38–39 (2010); RONAN 
DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE MOVEMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1695–1775) 73–74 (2004); and BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL 
BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 12 n.6 (1999). 
 144. See, e.g., David J. Brennan, The Root of Title to Copyright in Works, 2015 INTELL. PROP. 
Q. 289, 292–93 (noting that, surprisingly, the case was pleaded under the Statute of Anne and not 
under a common law right). 
 145. See, e.g., Perceval v. Phipps (1813) 35 Eng. Rep. 225, 225; 2 Ves. & B. 19, 19 (dissolving 
an injunction against publication of private letters); Granard v. Dunkin (1809) 1 Ball & Beat. 207 
(Ir. Ch.) (granting an injunction against publication of private letters). 
 146. Thompson v. Stanhope (1774) 27 Eng. Rep. 467, 476; Amb. 737, 737.  
 147. Id., Amb. at 737.  
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Defendant.148 Following the earl’s death, the widow sought to have the 
letters published.149 The earl’s heirs objected, arguing that his intention 
was always to have the letters destroyed after his death, and sought an 
injunction.150 Implicit in their objection was that publication would 
impact the public reputation and honor of the letters’ author, who had 
always intended to keep them private for this reason. Without much 
reasoning, the court granted the injunction.151 Pressed with the 
argument that the letters contained valuable content that the public 
deserved to see, the court “recommended it to the executors to permit 
the publication, in case they saw no objection to the work upon reading 
it.”152  
Whereas Pope chose to remain completely agnostic to the content 
of the Plaintiff’s letters and proceed on the mere recognition of the 
letters as literary works, Thompson apparently acknowledged the 
potentially embarrassing and personal nature of the content, but 
almost completely outsourced that recognition to the Plaintiff without 
any further scrutiny.  
Privative copyright claims reached their fullest recognition a 
short while later, in the case of Gee v. Pritchard,153 where the court was 
asked to grapple with the sensitive nature of the expression involved. 
The Defendant in the case was the stepson of the Plaintiff, and over the 
course of his life had corresponded with the Plaintiff.154 In such 
correspondence, the Plaintiff had often communicated matters “of a 
private and confidential nature” to him “relating to his morals and 
conduct in life.”155 When they had a falling out, the Defendant 
threatened to publish the correspondence, which the Plaintiff contested 
as a “violation of [her] right and interest” and noted that it was 
“intended to wound her feelings.”156 On this basis, she sought an 
injunction. 
What is interesting about the case is that it is reported as a 
colloquy between the court and the Plaintiff, wherein the court appears 
to be searching for an appropriate basis on which to afford relief. Early 
on in the argument, the court rejects the Plaintiff’s argument about 
hurt feelings, noting that “the continuance or the discontinuance of [a] 
 
148. Id., Amb. at 737. 
149. Id., Amb. at 737. 
 150. Id., Amb. at 738. 
 151. Id. at 477, Amb. at 740. 
 152. Id., Amb. at 740.  
 153. Gee v. Pritchard (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670; 2 Swans. 403. 
 154. See id. at 670, 2 Swans. at 403. 
 155. Id., 2 Swans. at 403–04.  
 156. Id. at 671, 2 Swans. at 405.  
        
42 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1:1 
friendship” can form no basis for the relief.157 While expressing some 
limited skepticism about the principle, the court nevertheless concluded 
that letters were legitimate literary works and could qualify for 
protection as property, which would entitle the Plaintiff to an 
injunction.158 All the same, the argument about “feelings” was not 
completely irrelevant, as it triggered the following observation from the 
court: 
I do not say that I am to interfere because the letters are written in confidence, or because 
the publication of them may wound the feelings of the Plaintiff; but if mischievous effects 
of that kind can be apprehended in cases in which this Court has been accustomed, on the 
ground of property, to forbid publication, it would not become me to abandon the 
jurisdiction which my predecessors have exercised, and refuse to forbid it.159 
While intriguing, the court’s language has been the subject of 
significant interpretive disagreement ever since.160 It is rooted in the 
distinction between law and equity, which soon became defunct.161 
Premised on the idea that “equity follows the law,” courts of equity often 
required proof of a right at law before they would interfere and grant 
relief.162 The court appears to be advancing the argument that although 
the Plaintiff’s subjective assessment of dignitary harm cannot form the 
jurisdictional basis of its intervention, it may nevertheless be the basis 
for the court’s relief once such jurisdiction is established on the basis of 
“property”—that is, copyright. Warren and Brandeis saw in Gee a move 
toward recognizing wounded feelings as the basis for its intervention, 
which is obviously incorrect.163 Instead, the court drew a distinction 
between the basis of its jurisdiction for intervention and the Plaintiff’s 
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 158. See id., 2 Swans. at 414. 
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 160. See W.B.G., Note and Comment, A Re-interpretation of Gee v. Pritchard, 25 MICH. L. REV. 
889 (1927) (arguing Gee has been misunderstood and does not in fact stand for the idea that “the 
office and jurisdiction of equity[,] unless enlarged by express statute[,] are limited to the protection 
of rights of property”). See generally MEGAN RICHARDSON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: ORIGINS AND 
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OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002). 
 162. For an account of this maxim and its application, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Does Equity 
Follow the Law of Torts?, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1926). 
 163. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 93, at 200–05 (arguing that the court’s use of property 
was a stand-in for privacy concerns). For a criticism of this interpretation, see W.B.G., supra note 
160, at 890 (“[N]aturally both court and counsel would be searching for the right and threatened 
tort in the field of property.”). 
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reasons for seeking relief.164 Authorial property justified the former, the 
Plaintiff’s subjective claim of dignitary harm the latter. 
The court’s refusal to fully engage the nature of the “feelings” 
and the specific nature of harm likely to accrue from the publication of 
the work may be partially explained by a rule that prevailed at the time, 
which denied both common law and statutory copyright protection for 
works that were unlawful or immoral.165 Lord Eldon, the author of the 
opinion in Gee, had in the year before decided another well-known case 
involving the right of first publication; in that case, the Plaintiff had 
transmitted the manuscript of a libelous poem to the Defendant with 
the intention of publishing it, but the Plaintiff ultimately changed his 
mind before its publication.166 When the Defendant nevertheless went 
ahead and published it, the Plaintiff sought an injunction, claiming a 
violation of his right.167 Lord Eldon denied the relief on the basis that 
the Plaintiff’s very right was in question because the work was not 
“innocent.”168 Consequently, a fuller investigation into the nature of the 
Plaintiff’s dignitary interest in privative copyright cases would have 
had courts running into considerations of libel, morality, and bad faith, 
which would have sullied the nature of the right at issue and 
undermined their jurisdiction. It is perhaps for this reason that Lord 
Eldon himself is fairly cryptic in Gee about the nature of the feelings at 
issue, an approach that would cement the subjective nature of the harm 
involved in such cases. 
The broadest—and most controversial—expansion of privative 
copyright claims was to come a few years later, in the celebrated case of 
Prince Albert v. Strange.169 The case cemented the basis for a court’s 
intervention on a subjective conception of dignitary harm but made the 
further move toward identifying a distinctive privacy interest. The case 
involved drawings and etchings that the Queen and her husband were 
in the practice of making as a hobby for their amusement.170 These 
drawings were “of subjects of private and domestic interest to 
themselves” and, to ensure their privacy, the couple took great pains to 
have them printed by a private press and retained possession of the 
 
 164. See W.B.G., supra note 160, at 890 (“Criminal libel was suggested and promptly rejected 
on the familiar principle that equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin the commission of crimes.”).  
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plates themselves.171 Somehow the drawings got into the hands of the 
Defendant, who proposed to hold a public exhibition showcasing them 
and, to that end, printed a catalogue describing all the works that were 
to be exhibited.172 The Plaintiffs took exception to this and sought an 
injunction.173 
In its opinion, the court considered it wholly unexceptional that 
the work at issue was a work of art—rather than a literary work—and 
readily acknowledged the Plaintiff’s right.174 The principal basis of the 
Plaintiff’s argument rested on the “right to determine whether [to] 
publish [the work] or not,” that is, the “right to the first publication,” to 
which the court acceded.175 Yet, the court went one step further. It held 
that the Defendant’s catalogue was nothing more than “a means of 
communicating knowledge and information of the original,” which 
would harm the Plaintiff’s personal interests just as much, and 
accordingly enjoined the publication and distribution of the catalogue 
as well.176 While this extension of protection heralded the onset of a 
separate privacy interest in the common law, it also had the effect of 
conflating the dignitary interest underlying the Plaintiff’s copyright 
claim, which was rooted in both representational and authorial 
autonomy, unlike the privacy claim that sounded in personal autonomy.  
Nevertheless, for our purposes, Prince Albert suggests that by 
the mid-nineteenth century, privative copyright claims had become 
largely unexceptional, especially at equity where the relief sought was 
an injunction. The court’s statement that “[t]he property of an author 
or composer of any work, whether of literature, art, or science, in such 
work unpublished and kept for his private use or pleasure, cannot be 
disputed” is telling in this regard.177 Not only was it now irrelevant 
whether the work qualified for protection under the statute, but the law 
had grown perfectly content with assuming the existence of a dignitary 
interest based on the plaintiffs’ assertions and deferring to them on the 
question. This eventually got turned into the right of first publication, 
specifically for unpublished works. 
The early development of privative copyright claims highlights 
a few things. First, courts’ principal concern in these cases—at least 
initially—centered around whether the works at issue could qualify as 
protectable subject matter under the terms of the statute. They readily 
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answered this in the affirmative by denying the need for any scrutiny 
of the work’s substantive merits, a position that would continue well 
into the future. (A secondary concern was the extent to which a 
plaintiff’s claim had been abandoned by virtue of the limited or private 
communication of the content, for which they relied on the distinction 
between possessory and incorporeal property.) Second, while courts 
recognized the dignitary nature of plaintiffs’ motivations, they did no 
more than suggest that these concerns were legitimate and consciously 
avoided any deeper examination of their credibility. In so accepting a 
subjective version of the plaintiff’s account of harm, they were likely 
avoiding getting entangled in the domestic affairs of the litigants, many 
of whom were prominent personalities at the time, or in the complex 
interplay between copyright, libel, morality, and public policy. It also 
had the effect of allowing them to proceed using the formal language of 
the law without having to make any special exceptions for the nature of 
the interest at issue. This, in turn, allowed the domain of privative 
claims to expand beyond just literary works, to other categories where 
the plaintiff asserted similar motivations and showed the existence of a 
valid right. Third, and finally, an overwhelming majority of these cases 
were brought at equity, since the plaintiff was seeking an injunction. 
This enabled the court to exercise a greater degree of flexibility and 
discretion in molding the bases for its jurisdiction and interference in 
the case. 
B. Early American Law 
The first U.S. copyright statute, the Act of 1790, was modeled in 
large part on the Statute of Anne.178 The earliest reported privative 
copyright claim was brought shortly after, in 1811, and adopted a 
noticeably different approach from its English counterparts.179 While it 
relied on English precedents for its position, the court openly embraced 
a more objective approach to the dignitary interest at issue.180 
The case of Denis v. LeClerc illustrates this objective 
approach.181 The facts involved a letter written by the Plaintiff to a lady 
wherein he sought to “pay[ ] his addresses” to her, that is, he attempted 
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to court her.182 The content of the letter was therefore obviously private 
and potentially embarrassing. The Defendant, through means 
unknown, obtained copies of the letter and sought to publish it, to which 
the Plaintiff objected.183 At first, the Plaintiff obtained an injunction.184 
In his answer to the injunction, the Defendant annexed a copy of the 
letter and filed it in the office of court clerk, after which he advertised 
publicly that others interested in reading the letter might do so by 
visiting the clerk’s office.185 The Plaintiff then approached the court 
again, seeking to hold the Defendant in contempt.186 The court obliged 
in an elaborate opinion. 
The court initially described the relevant English authorities to 
confirm the validity of the Plaintiff’s right to the injunction.187 
Interestingly enough, the Defendant attempted to distinguish these 
authorities by pointing out that whereas the defendants in those cases 
had all been seeking to publish the letters at issue and thereby seek a 
profit, he had clear nonmonetary reasons for his actions in that he was 
doing so “with the sole view of disclosing the writer’s secrets and 
wounding his feelings.”188 The court found this argument to be of no 
consequence, but instead to even more strongly favor the Plaintiff’s 
right.189 Additionally, this concession by the Defendant allowed the 
court to venture into the nature of the harm that the Defendant was 
attempting to bring about, which required a closer examination of the 
work itself.190  
Canvassing a whole set of French, English, and Roman authors 
on the ethics and morality of publishing private correspondence, the 
court observed that when letters were “written with mystery and 
contain[ed] confidential things,” the wrong from revealing their content 
was even “greater when the secret of a letter is unveiled with the only 
design of DOING AN INJURY to the writer.”191 The Plaintiff’s effort to 
“open his heart, without any apprehension of that being revealed” in his 
letter, which was covered in “mystery and confidence,” was worthy of 
additional protection from the Defendant’s public actions, which were 
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entirely to “vex the plaintiff.”192 And thus the court adopted an overtly 
objective approach toward the Plaintiff’s dignitary interest and the 
corresponding disseminative harm through a closer examination of the 
contents of the letter and the Defendant’s motives in publicizing it. In 
so doing, it unwittingly broke with prior English precedents.193 
While early American cases approvingly cited and relied on 
English precedents for their principles, they at the same time went out 
of their way to add more justificatory content for their holdings. This is 
in clear contrast to their English counterparts, which were tersely 
worded and often structured using the language of formal rules and 
principles. In so doing, American courts often unknowingly deviated 
from English law. Much of this appears to have also been influenced by 
prominent legal treatise writers, many of whom were deeply influential 
in the jurisprudence of the time.194  
Joseph Story, for instance, in his classic work on equity, devoted 
an entire section to understanding how courts of equity approached the 
issue of injunctions in cases involving the publication of private 
letters.195 While he drew from the finite set of English precedents, he 
attempted to synthesize them using rational principles. This synthesis 
added a gloss that was hardly appreciated at the time. Unlike any of 
the English cases, Story offered a rationale for protecting the 
publication of private letters: 
In a moral view, the publication of such letters . . . is perhaps one of the most odious 
breaches of private confidence, of social duty, and of honorable feelings, which can well be 
imagined. It strikes at the root of all that free and mutual interchange of advice, opinions, 
and sentiments, between relatives and friends, and correspondents, which is so essential 
to the well-being of society, and to the spirit of a liberal courtesy and refinement. It may 
involve whole families in great distress, from the public display of facts and 
circumstances, which were reposed in the bosoms of others under the deepest and most 
affecting confidence, that they should for ever remain inviolable secrets.196 
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Story thus offered a theory of harm for copyright law’s 
intervention in such instances. While his account of harm encompassed 
disseminative harm—of a private nature—it also interestingly adopted 
a collectivist mindset. In other words, the harm was not just the actual 
effect on the plaintiff-author, but additionally the effect on the fabric of 
society as a whole, since it would alter the form and nature of individual 
communications as a result. Of course, not all legal treatises were this 
forceful; some merely offered an account of English precedents.197 
But Story’s account formed the basis for the court’s intervention 
in the 1855 New York case of Woolsey v. Judd, regarded as having 
settled the question of copyright protection for private letters under 
American law.198 The case also cemented the legitimacy of privative 
copyright claims. The Defendant in Woolsey was the editor of a local 
newspaper who had come into possession of a few private letters written 
by the Plaintiff and sought to publish them.199 His motive was “fixing 
upon the plaintiff . . . the imputation of being the authors or instigators 
of certain anonymous and abusive publications, relative to a religious 
society.”200  
The court began its elaborate and wordy opinion by first noting 
that the Copyright Act of 1831 specifically empowered courts to grant 
injunctions to “restrain the publication” of a work sought to be 
published “without the consent of the author.”201 It then canvassed the 
English authorities in exquisite detail to confirm the existence of the 
Plaintiff’s right qua author of the letters.202 Relying on Story’s 
exposition, the court agreed that the basis for its intervention needed 
to be an actual legal property right, and not just the possibility of harm 
to the Plaintiff from the publication.203 The basis of this right was in the 
court’s view just like the ordinary rights of chattel ownership. Just as 
an artist who produces “a painting [that is] a wretched daub” or a 
“statue [that is] a lamentable abortion” has the right to prevent “its 
public exhibition” against his will, which would “disgrace the artist,” 
the same would apply to literary property.204 According to the court, the 
nature of this right was “absolute,” in that ensuring the 
nondissemination of the work was a viable basis for relief.205 “As owner, 
 
 197. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 98, at 89–100. 
 198. 11 How. Pr. 49, 53–54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855). 
 199. Id. at 49–51. 
 200. Id. at 51. 
 201. Id. at 51–52. 
 202. Id. at 54–79.  
 203. Id. at 53–55. 
 204. Id. at 57. 
 205. Id.at 58.  
        
2020] PRIVATIVE COPYRIGHT 49 
he has an absolute right to suppress as well as to publish; and he is as 
fully entitled to the protection and aid of the court, when suppression is 
his sole and averred object, as when he intends to publish.”206 
The Woolsey court went to great lengths to distance the basis of 
copyright protection in the Plaintiff’s work from any need to show either 
market significance or literary merit. Neither “intended publication” 
nor “pecuniary value” were requirements for protection as 
copyrightable subject matter, in the court’s view.207 The court also 
rejected any scrutiny of the substance of the work for its “intrinsic 
merits,” so as to connect it to the Plaintiff’s basis for suppressing it.208 
 A related move seen in the opinion is the court’s effort to 
distance the Plaintiff’s attempt to suppress the work—that is, its 
privative nature—from what is often described as the right of first 
publication.209 As an affirmative right, the right of first publication 
entitles the author to determine when and how to publish the work.210 
Yet, as an analytical matter, it appears premised on the existence of an 
intention to publish the work, which could be taken to imply that when 
the author openly disavows such an intention, the right disappears.211 
Early English case law on the right of first publication had largely 
involved pecuniary motives on the part of either or both plaintiffs and 
defendants.212 To the Woolsey court, the two were analytically distinct, 
even if considered sides of the same coin. The right in the unpublished 
letters was the right “to control the act of publication, and, in the 
exercise of his own discretion, to decide whether there shall be any 
publication at all.”213 To equate the two would be to deny “that the 
writer has any title to relief at all, when his object is not to publish, but 
[to] suppress.”214 
In settling a host of interpretive questions surrounding 
unpublished letters, Woolsey also confirmed the place of privative 
copyright claims under American copyright law. And it did so not just 
as a matter of common law copyright, but as an interpretation of the 
federal statute and its allowance for an injunction to restrain an 
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unauthorized publication. Perhaps most importantly, though, in 
seeking to strengthen the independent analytical basis of the plaintiff’s 
right, which it described as “absolute” and “unlimited,” the court 
effectively returned the law of privative copyright claims back to relying 
on a purely subjective conception of harm.215 Indeed, in some respects, 
Woolsey went beyond the English precedents insofar as it consciously 
allowed for the possibility that the plaintiff might have no verifiable 
reason for the exercise of her right through the claim. Such a possibility 
would nevertheless enable the court to move forward on a presumption 
of some reason since the law was to concern itself with no more than 
the bare existence of the right. Later courts adopted the logic of Woolsey 
and maintained its adherence to an absolute conception of the right, 
which would entitle the plaintiff to suppress the work for any reason, 
without inviting the court’s scrutiny of the particular harm being 
complained of.216  
Early American jurisprudence on privative copyright claims 
built on English doctrine and in so doing, synthesized, rationalized, and 
justified the analytical basis of these claims. While American courts as 
a whole took the nature of the plaintiff’s dignitary interest and 
corresponding disseminative harm much more seriously in their actual 
exposition of the case and their rationalization of claims therein, they 
at the same time sought to distance the legal doctrine itself from being 
contingent on proof of such disseminative harm, preferring instead to 
validate the outcome in the formal doctrinal concepts of property 
(ownership or title) and tort (wrong). This latter move was but a 
reflection of an approach to legal reasoning that dominated at the time, 
but it had the effect of cementing the legitimacy of privative copyright 
claims by allowing disseminative harm to flourish as an independent—
yet unstated and unexamined—category of harms that could 
legitimately form the basis for a plaintiff’s copyright claim. This 
expository aspect of harm highlights an important transition in the 
development of privative copyright claims: it moved the doctrine away 
from the domain of damnum sine injuria (harm without an actionable 
injury) but not quite into the territory of injuria sine damno (an 
actionable injury without proof or verification of harm).217 That latter 
move towards injuria sine damno occurred in the modern era, as 
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copyright law became heavily statutory, and with it judicial decisions 
on the topic became less expository and more interpretive. 
C. Modern Federal Copyright Law 
The Copyright Act of 1909 was Congress’s first major foray into 
an omnibus revision of the copyright statute.218 Despite attempting to 
federalize significant parts of copyright law, it nevertheless chose to 
allow state common law protection for literary works to subsist in 
tandem. This bifurcation revolved around the idea of “publication.” The 
act of publication caused a work to lose its common law protection and 
potentially obtain federal statutory protection (subject to certain other 
conditions).219 Unpublished works retained their common law 
protection under state laws.  
The Act of 1909 expressly preserved common law protection by 
providing that its provisions were not to be construed “to annul or limit 
the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common 
law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such 
unpublished work without his consent.”220 Notable in this preservation 
was the reference to equity and the fact that the right extended to 
preventing the unauthorized “use” of the work. 
The language of the 1909 Act cemented the legitimacy of 
privative copyright claims. The works underlying such claims (for 
example, letters) were given an overtly neutral classification as 
“unpublished works,” and the absolute nature of the right at issue was 
statutorily recognized by granting its author or owner the exclusive 
right to use the work. Of course, since the provision of the Act merely 
preserved existing law, it never formed the basis of courts’ continued 
recognition of privative copyright claims. 
For the most part, courts continued to apply a subjective 
approach to the content of the works and the disseminative harm being 
alleged by the plaintiff. Instead of seeking to derive the logic for 
privative claims in the individualized nature of the work and the 
dignitary interest at issue, they looked to principles of labor instead as 
justifying a claim of ownership. In Baker v. Libbie, a case decided by the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the Plaintiff sought an 
injunction to restrain the publication of a private unpublished letter.221 
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Looking to both English and American authorities, the court considered 
the question of protectability settled and granted the Plaintiff’s 
request.222 The basis of this right, to the Court, was a matter of principle 
since “[t]he labor of composing letters for private and familiar 
correspondence may be trifling, or it may be severe, but it is none the 
less the result of an expenditure of thought and time” and “[t]he market 
value of such an effort may be measured by the opinions of others, but 
the fact of property is not created thereby.”223 
What is also intriguing about the opinion is the court’s express 
recognition that it did not need to scrutinize the Plaintiff’s motives for 
the action, or the underlying basis for the harm. In seeking to examine 
the nature of the right at issue, the court noted that some kinds of 
letters—those of “extreme affection and other fiduciary 
communications”—may imply an obligation of secrecy.224 Yet, the court 
observed: “This case does not involve personal feelings or what has been 
termed the right to privacy . . . [since] there appears to be nothing about 
these letters, knowledge of which by strangers would violate even 
delicate feelings.”225 Taken in isolation, these comments may suggest 
the court’s adoption of an objective approach to the disseminative harm; 
yet when viewed entirely as part of the court’s dicta, handed down after 
its finding for the Plaintiff without any basis other than ownership, it 
suggests something else. It instead reveals the court’s efforts to distance 
the Plaintiff’s invocation of literary property, that is, common law 
copyright, from the “right to privacy” as a stand-alone cause as 
advocated by Warren and Brandeis in their article, which the court 
readily cited.226 The court’s solution to bifurcate privative copyright 
claims from privacy claims was an attempt to situate the latter as 
entailing wounded feelings, while limiting the former to an account of 
ownership. And yet, ownership was not an economically driven 
argument, but instead one justified by labor and the individualized 
effort put into the creation. 
Other courts were less ambitious in this regard and preferred to 
adopt the formal rule of ownership without any discussion of the 
underlying content in the letter.227 This is not to suggest that courts 
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altogether ignored the content at issue. To the contrary, when called on 
to examine the content—either by the plaintiff or by the defendant’s 
attempted reliance on an exception to the traditional principles of 
ownership—courts engaged in that task and on occasion denied the 
claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. International Magazine Co. 
is illustrative.228 Called on to intervene and grant an injunction against 
the Defendant’s attempt to publish a letter that would reveal the inner 
workings of the Plaintiff organization and discourage membership, the 
court refused; it concluded instead that the letter appeared to be “an 
instrument or means for the accomplishment of some unlawful purpose 
or object,” which could not form the basis of the court’s equitable 
intervention.229 
The comprehensive codification of copyright that occurred in 
1976 changed most of what had transpired in relation to privative 
copyright claims under the common law. Whereas prior copyright 
statutes had revolved around the act of “publication,” thereby creating 
a bifurcated system wherein unpublished works obtained protection 
under common law copyright and published works under the statute, 
the 1976 Act eliminated the centrality of publication altogether. In its 
place, it introduced the idea of “fixation,” under which any original work 
of authorship that was fixed in a medium of expression became eligible 
for copyright from the moment of such fixation.230 The obvious result 
was that works that had been the basis of privative claims under 
common law copyright now became eligible for statutory copyright 
protection. The Act also incorporated the right of first publication, 
which had formed the basis of privative copyright claims at common 
law, into the exclusive distribution right.231 
However, the most significant effect on privative claims from the 
codification and merger of the two systems was undoubtedly the 
availability of the fair use doctrine to defendants. The fair use doctrine 
can exempt defendants from copyright infringement; it entails 
scrutinizing various factors relating to the work at issue, the 
defendant’s use of it, and the related effects of such usage.232 Developed 
by Justice Story in the mid-nineteenth-century decision of Folsom v. 
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Marsh,233 the doctrine came to be understood as a defense to statutory 
copyright infringement actions.234 Indeed, no reported common law 
copyright decision invoked the doctrine. The 1976 Act for the first time 
codified—albeit as a common law restatement—the fair use doctrine.235 
But in eliminating common law copyright for fixed, yet unpublished, 
works, it subjected an entirely new set of works to the doctrine for the 
first time. 
Unsurprisingly, courts initially struggled to make sense of the 
fair use defense in relation to unpublished works. In Harper & Row, a 
case involving an unpublished work (though not a privative claim), the 
Supreme Court equivocated on the extent to which the unpublished 
nature of the work influenced fair use, eventually concluding that the 
unpublished nature disfavored fair use.236 The best known intersection 
of fair use and privative claims occurred a few years later in the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Salinger v. Random House, Inc.237 The case 
involved personal letters written by the reclusive novelist J.D. Salinger, 
which had fallen into the hands of a biographer, Ian Hamilton.238 
Hamilton, who was working on a biography of Salinger, chose to quote 
from them and paraphrase them rather extensively in the book.239 
When Salinger learned of this, he objected to the biography’s reliance 
on his unpublished letters and commenced an action for copyright 
infringement.240 The Defendant in turn asserted fair use as a defense.241 
The district court found for the Defendant, applying the fair use 
doctrine without any modification to the works at issue.242 On appeal, 
the Second Circuit reversed. 
In a well-known opinion authored by Judge Newman, the court 
concluded that “special weight” had to be accorded to the fact that the 
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work was unpublished.243 Using this rubric and analyzing the facts 
through the various fair use factors, the court found there to be no fair 
use.244 Judge Newman’s opinion seemingly sought to give implicit effect 
to privacy considerations through the language and structure of fair 
use.245 Particularly salient was the court’s observation that 
unpublished works “normally enjoy complete protection against copying 
any protected expression.”246 A later opinion of the same court 
reiterated this position, effectively placing unpublished works—and 
privative claims—on a pedestal seemingly beyond the reach of fair 
use.247 These developments prompted Congress to intervene in 1992 
because it was worried that the fair use doctrine would cease to have 
any application to unpublished works.248 It amended the fair use 
provision in the 1976 Act to provide that “[t]he fact that a work is 
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is 
made upon consideration of all the above factors.”249 
The amendment resulted in fair use being asserted on a regular 
basis against privative copyright claims, and with a good degree of 
success. On the rare occasion that plaintiffs prevailed in this balancing, 
courts nevertheless went out of their way to emphasize that they were 
not giving effect to the plaintiff’s privacy interests, but instead limiting 
themselves to copyright, as though this was not obvious.  
All the same, when courts allowed the fair use claim to succeed, 
they placed significant reliance on the absence of any provable harm 
(actual or potential) to the market for the plaintiff’s work from the 
defendant’s actions—the well-known fourth fair use factor.250 
Examining the existence (or absence) of market harm for privative 
copyright claims is an obvious mismatch, something that courts seem 
unwilling to recognize in their commitment to copyright’s utilitarian 
goals. In recent work, one scholar has described this as courts’ use of 
“market gibberish” to mask other considerations.251  
Regardless of courts’ reasons for this market-oriented move, it 
nevertheless had the long-term effect of deterring privative copyright 
claims being brought as privative claims, that is, with an overt 
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assertion of disseminative harm, whenever a fair use defense was 
plausible. This trend continues to this day. Plaintiffs instead prefer to 
assert—and indeed sympathetic courts are willing to infer—some kind 
of market harm, even if only to a licensing market, purely in order to 
get around courts’ myopic construction of the fair use doctrine. The 
fairly recent Ninth Circuit decision in Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc. 
is a perfect example of this phenomenon.252 
The Plaintiffs in the case were a well-known pop music star and 
her manager, who got married in secret.253 In order to maintain the 
secrecy of the wedding, the couple limited the number of witnesses and 
took a very limited number of photographs, which “were intended for 
the couple’s private use.”254 Through unscrupulous means, the 
photographs fell into the hands of an individual who sold them to the 
Defendant, a gossip magazine that published them.255 The district court 
found for the Defendant, concluding that the publisher’s use of the 
photographs constituted fair use.256 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed, in a rare denial of fair use for a privative claim.257 
The court’s decision was predicated on an analysis of the four 
fair use factors.258 On the first factor, the nature of the protected work, 
the court placed extraordinary emphasis on the unpublished nature of 
the work.259 Describing this fact as a “critical element,” the court found 
it to weigh in favor of the Plaintiffs.260 On the second factor, the amount 
and substantiality of the copying, the court was swayed by the fact that 
the Defendant published all six of the wedding photographs that it 
received.261 In the court’s words, the “use was not just substantial, it 
was total,” which “weigh[ed] decisively against fair use.”262 Yet, it was 
the fourth factor that would make a difference, since in the court’s own 
view, it was “the single most important element of fair use.”263 On this 
factor, the district court had taken the view criticized above—that there 
was no market harm since the Plaintiffs did not intend to publish and 
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distribute the photographs.264 The Ninth Circuit concluded that there 
was in fact “an actual market” for the photos.265 This market was 
presumed to exist because the couple was “in the business of selling 
images of themselves and they ha[d] done so in the past.”266 The 
Defendant’s actions lowered the “demand for the pictures in the actual 
market” which weighed against fair use.267 
It is the court’s reasoning on this last factor that is most 
puzzling. By the court’s own admission, the Plaintiffs’ primary (if not 
exclusive) motivation in retaining the photographs as unpublished was 
the intended “secrecy” and “private use.”268 Such secrecy no doubt has 
a potential price—in that the scarcity renders the information more 
valuable. Yet, to use that fact to presume an actual market for the work 
remains something of a stretch. In the end, what the court was 
undoubtedly motivated by was the private nature of the work at issue, 
seen in the court’s discussion of the embarrassment that the Plaintiffs 
suffered upon the public revelation of their marriage.269 Despite the 
majority opinion’s sympathy for the couple, its failure to understand the 
nature of the dignitary interest involved did more harm than good for 
privative copyright claims. Judge McKeown’s observation, albeit in 
dicta, that a celebrity’s private messages to another somehow render 
the message nonprivate and therefore unprotected under copyright 
law’s distribution and display rights, showcases this failure.270 The 
court’s unfortunate reasoning was, however, a mere representation of 
how the fair use doctrine has come to be understood by courts and 
misapplied in relation to privative copyright claims. 
A more plausible (and analytically defensible) application of the 
fair use doctrine to privative claims, such as the one in Monge, would 
have entailed treating the fourth fair use factor as largely unhelpful in 
the context of claims driven by disseminative harm. This would have 
allowed the court to focus on the other factors, including the 
unpublished nature of the work, which might have produced the same 
outcome but on a firmer footing. 
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The dissenting opinion in the case offered an even more 
problematic approach to the fourth fair use factor. According to the 
dissent, since the Plaintiffs had evidenced a clear intention to keep the 
work secret and never publish it, the facts revealed a “market failure” 
that required finding the fourth fair use factor in favor of the 
Defendant.271 In the dissent’s view, the refusal to publish was motivated 
by “a desire unrelated to the goals of copyright,” since it was not market 
related.272 Implicit in this framing was the idea that noneconomic 
considerations such as those at the heart of privative claims were 
irrelevant to copyright. For this proposition, the dissent relied on a well-
known law review article on fair use and market failure.273 Yet, it failed 
to note the author’s clear statement therein that “fair use should not be 
used to force disclosure of works that the author has heretofore kept 
secret.”274 
The court’s opinion in Monge is hardly unique in its failure to 
reflect on the obvious mismatch between fair use and privative claims. 
Prior courts, including district courts, have encountered the same 
predicament, and some have even gone so far as to call out the anomaly 
and suggest reforms. In Lish v. Harper’s Magazine Foundation, the 
Plaintiff was a well-known fiction writer who brought an infringement 
action against a newspaper that published his letter to prospective 
students without his consent.275 The newspaper made editorial 
revisions to the letter and made it seem as though the edited version 
had been authored by the Plaintiff, but thereafter used the editing to 
claim fair use of the letter.276 
Despite never having published or marketed a letter before, the 
Plaintiff argued that the Defendant’s unauthorized publication affected 
the actual and potential market value of the work.277 The court saw 
through this and rejected the argument, finding there to be no market 
effect—present or potential—from the publication.278 Yet, in so doing 
the court cast doubt on the singular importance of the fourth fair use 
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factor as interpreted by some courts.279 In direct response to the 
Defendant’s assertion that the noneconomic nature of the Plaintiff’s 
work suggested weaker copyright protection and correlated to a clearer 
fair use argument, the court made clear that “providing economic 
incentives for the creation of works of art is not necessarily the only 
value which the fair use doctrine embodies or protects.”280  
The Lish opinion is an interesting and bold recognition of the 
mismatch between the dominant incentives-based understanding of 
copyright under the 1976 Act and the nature of interests and 
motivations involved in privative copyright claims. All the same, it 
highlights the state of privative claims under modern copyright 
doctrine. Due to the utilitarian emphasis in current law, plaintiff-
authors bringing these claims consciously mask the nature of the 
dignitary interest involved in the claim instead of highlighting it. When 
presented with a defense of fair use and its overt need for a showing of 
market harm—or its absence—they then recast or embellish their 
overtly neutral claim with arguments about hypothetical markets and 
monetary values. In the process, both the true nature of the interest at 
stake and the form of harm involved get little attention or explication 
by courts, who—even while finding for plaintiffs—are forced to do so in 
starkly utilitarian terms. 
IV. ADJUDICATING PRIVATIVE COPYRIGHT CLAIMS 
As the prior discussion reveals, privative copyright claims have 
fallen into disrepute in modern times due to the overt utilitarian focus 
that copyright jurisprudence and scholarship have assumed. This 
remains the case even though these claims have a defensibly 
independent analytical and normative basis for their existence within 
the copyright landscape. All the same, privative copyright claims are 
hardly without their share of problems, the most obvious of which is 
their ability to interfere with free speech by enabling authors to censor 
publication and distribution under the garb of a dignitary interest. 
Indeed, as noted previously, much of the concern with these claims 
originates from the belief that the line between privative copyright 
claims and censorship is a difficult one to regulate. 
This Part sets out a mechanism for courts to use when 
adjudicating privative copyright claims—which at once entails 
recognizing the independent legitimacy of these claims and balancing 
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their underlying motivations against competing considerations. The 
mechanism developed here has four interconnected components:  
(1) identifying legitimate privative copyright claims, (2) adapting the 
fair use defense to the nature of the interests involved in these claims, 
(3) integrating a “newsworthiness” limit to such claims through fair use, 
and (4) developing an appropriate remedial response for the 
disseminative harm involved. 
A. Sifting Through Infringement Claims 
For the most part, modern copyright law does not care about a 
plaintiff’s motives for commencing an infringement action, an approach 
that fits with how private law areas work.281 This has obviously allowed 
a plurality of considerations to influence plaintiffs in their actions and 
helps account for the emergence of privative copyright claims brought 
for nonpecuniary motives. All the same, there is nothing to prevent 
courts from taking a closer look at the facts at issue to scrutinize a 
plaintiff’s reasons for the claim and examine its fit. 
A somewhat related domain where federal courts have begun an 
approach along these lines within copyright litigation involves the 
phenomenon of “copyright trolling”—a catch-all phrase that broadly 
represents efforts by copyright plaintiffs to monetize their litigation 
actions and generate an independent revenue stream through litigation 
rather than through the marketplace for the work itself.282 While courts 
disfavor such plaintiffs, they have routinely been at a loss for 
appropriate mechanisms to rein trolling in.283 In recent times, however, 
they have shown a marked openness to scrutinizing the plaintiff’s 
motives for bringing the action and have exercised their discretion—
embedded within various procedural doctrines—when they deem the 
motives inappropriate, then interpreting and applying copyright’s 
various doctrines on the basis of such motives.284 
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A similar approach would serve privative copyright claims well 
and enable courts to address the unique nature of these claims on their 
own terms. A privative copyright claim should be identifiable by three 
overarching features, which a court should be able to easily discern from 
the plaintiff’s filings.  
First, the plaintiff bringing the action should be the putative 
author or creator of the work.285 This is essential, since the interest at 
the heart of these claims is a distinctively dignitary one, which is hard 
to sustain with a market-based alienation or assignment. A limited 
exception might be carved out for heirs, who inherit some of the 
dignitary concerns of the original author, as such transfers are 
distinctively noncommercial and involuntary in nature.286  
Second, the work must have remained “private” at the time that 
the lawsuit is brought. While this is hardly an independent category 
within copyright law, it is showcased through the work being both 
unpublished and unlicensed. The author should not have publicly 
distributed the work, nor should she have allowed strangers to use it 
indiscriminately in a manner that contradicts the existence of the 
disseminative harm, which is at the core of the claim.287 All the same, 
it is important to appreciate that a limited distribution to private 
members—such as the intended recipient of a confidential message—is 
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not the same as a public distribution, a difference that some courts have 
failed to make.288 Thus, it is essential that the work be legally 
unpublished, though not necessarily undistributed.289  
Third, the work must be revelatory of the author’s identity. This 
is an important requirement that gets at the root of the dignitary 
interest and the idea of compelled authorship discussed previously. Yet 
at the same time, it remains an open question whether this is something 
that courts should scrutinize on their own, rendering the requirement 
an objective one, or whether they should merely defer to the plaintiff’s 
assertions on this, making it a subjective requirement. Current 
privative copyright jurisprudence adopts the latter approach, which 
avoids a host of subjective judgments on the part of the court for works 
that fall into a grey area—for example, photographs of body parts. 
Once satisfied, these three requirements would together allow 
the court to classify the claim as a privative claim, which would then 
enable it to apply copyright’s various other doctrines in different ways, 
in the process both protecting privative claims and safeguarding 
against the possibility of overreach, to which we next turn. 
B. Fair Use for “Dignitary” Works 
The idea that “providing economic incentives for the creation of 
works . . . is not necessarily the only value which the fair use doctrine 
embodies or protects”290 is hardly new. And yet, few courts have 
successfully instantiated this idea into their interpretation and 
application of the fair use doctrine. When Congress codified fair use in 
the current copyright statute, it made clear that it intended for courts 
to continue to develop the doctrine in the common law fashion, as they 
had done before the codification, and that the four factors embodied in 
the provision were nonexhaustive.291 Despite this, courts today take few 
liberties with the four factors and feel compelled to run their analysis 
through them in an almost rote manner. 
The only real exception to this trend has been the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., which introduced 
the idea of a “transformative use” under the first factor (the nature and 
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purpose of a defendant’s use), and thereafter allowed classification of 
use under that factor to influence analysis within the others.292 In 
principle, there should be no impediment to courts doing the same for 
privative claims—but this time under the second factor, the nature and 
character of the protected work. Already, the work’s classification as 
“unpublished” remains a legitimate part of the analysis, which has 
caused some conflict among courts.293 Yet, the category of unpublished 
does not fully capture the interest at stake in privative claims. 
A more apt category for courts to consider under the second 
factor would be the “dignitary” nature of the work, a combination of its 
being (1) unpublished, (2) private, and (3) embodying expression 
directly implicating the author’s persona and identity. While this 
classification should of course not be dispositive in the overall analysis, 
it should weigh heavily and influence the interpretation and application 
of the other factors. Much like with the classification of a defendant’s 
use as “transformative,” the identification of a plaintiff’s work as being 
of dignitary significance should inflect the court’s analysis of factor 
three—the amount and substantiality of what was taken.294 The 
quantity and quality of the defendant’s copying would thus come to be 
assessed against the extent to which it impinges on the plaintiff’s 
dignitary concerns. A small amount of copying might have serious 
dignitary ramifications owing to its revelatory nature, even if it is 
otherwise quantitatively insignificant in the abstract.  
While the first fair use factor could be interpreted and applied 
without much modification, the fourth factor, relating to the value of 
the work and the market effects of the copying, should be understood as 
receding in importance once the work is classified as “dignitary” in 
nature. This would obviate the need for courts and litigants to identify 
an artificial market for the work and speculate about the effects of the 
defendant’s use on that presumptive market. Some have suggested that 
courts take the provision’s use of the term “value” in the fourth fair use 
factor literally and incorporate considerations of noncommercial value 
into their analysis.295 Creative as this may be, it is unlikely to prove 
helpful in privative claims, where the defendant’s publication will 
inevitably interfere with the subjective dignitary value of the work to 
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the author. Consequently, the fourth fair use factor is best treated as 
unhelpful for privative copyright claims lest it become a factor that will 
invariably favor the plaintiff. 
The fair use analysis would thus effectively revolve around the 
first three fair use factors. As an example of its application, consider 
again the facts in Monge, where a celebrity couple had taken 
photographs of their secret wedding and the Defendant magazine 
somehow obtained copies of those photographs and published them in 
an exposé.296 On the first factor, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
publication by the newspaper was a commercial use, which was only 
marginally transformative, even though the Defendant claimed to be 
engaging in the act of “news reporting.”297 This factor was found to be 
neutral, at best.298 On the second factor, applying the formulation 
above, a court would now examine whether the work was a dignitary 
work—in being unpublished, private, and implicating the authors’ 
personas.299 All three of these elements were present in the photographs 
at issue in Monge, in the court’s own description of the facts.300 This 
factor would thus favor the Plaintiffs and now influence the analysis of 
the third factor relating to the amount and substantiality of the 
copying. The facts revealed that the Defendant had published “every 
single photo of the wedding and almost every photo of the wedding 
night.”301 The copying thus heavily implicated the dignitary component 
of the works at issue insofar as it was revelatory of personal and private 
details, well beyond what might have been needed for the news story. 
Given the absence of a market for such dignitary works, the fourth 
factor might be treated as irrelevant.  
Analyzing the facts of Monge through the proposed framework 
would have produced the same outcome the Ninth Circuit arrived at, 
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except that the court would now overtly recognize the disseminative 
harm at issue and the dignitary concerns uniquely implicated in the 
works involved. The fair use framework proposed here remains 
perfectly compatible with the terms of the statute and with Congress’s 
intent behind it. All that remains is for courts to acknowledge that fair 
use—much like copyright itself—embodies multifarious normative 
ideals. 
C. Newsworthiness 
Privative copyright claims very often involve defendants who 
seek to undo the private and unpublished nature of the work in the 
name of “news,” on the assumption that the public deserves to be 
informed of the content and authorship of the work involved, even if 
against the wishes of the author. There is at times significant merit to 
this objective, especially when the work involves matters of legitimate 
public concern rather than just gossip or entertainment. To impede the 
publication of such matters risks allowing privative claims to be used 
as a form of censorship, potentially running afoul of the First 
Amendment. 
Copyright law has long been reluctant to recognize an 
independent newsworthiness exception to infringement. In Harper & 
Row, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the idea, especially in 
relation to unpublished works, worrying that it would incentivize 
defendants to “clothe” their copying in journalistic language, and at the 
same time counterintuitively accord works of “greatest importance to 
the public” lesser protection under the law.302 All the same, privacy 
law—especially the action for public disclosure of private facts, the 
closest noncopyright privative claim to privative copyright claims—has 
come to recognize an independent newsworthiness defense, in the 
interests of free speech.303 Both these considerations are capable of 
being given substantial recognition by copyright doctrine. 
Creating an independent (or per se) newsworthiness exception 
is of course well beyond the prerogative of federal courts. All the same, 
the idea itself is capable of being given more direct treatment within 
the first fair use factor, where it is today analyzed in cursory terms at 
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best.304 And in so doing, the analysis might benefit from the approach 
adopted by courts in privacy law. 
Within the domain of privacy law, the idea of newsworthiness 
has moved away from being a defense that would apply automatically 
once the defendant identifies its own purpose as relating to news. 
Instead, courts today ask whether the content of the claimed news was 
a matter of “legitimate public concern.”305 This allows the category to 
keep up with changing journalistic practices as well as the “mores of the 
community,” but requires courts to scrutinize the particular content at 
issue to match it with the claimed newsworthiness.306 Indeed, this 
approach goes some way in mitigating the concern raised in Harper & 
Row, namely that a newsworthiness exception would incentivize 
newspapers to clothe their copying in the garb of journalism and require 
courts to scrutinize the content of the publication and the newspaper’s 
real motives behind it. 
The newsworthiness exception and the notion of matters having 
a “legitimate public concern” have received rather expansive treatment 
in the law of privacy, given that this area deals with the protection of 
factual information.307 Translating it to the copyright context therefore 
requires modifying it for expressive rather than factual content, given 
that copyright law abjures protection for purely factual content. The 
approach to newsworthiness taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit in the case of Núñez v. Caribbean International News 
Corp. presents an important initial foray into adopting this idea.308 The 
case involved the Defendant television station’s display of scantily clad 
photographs of a model taken by the Plaintiff, for the purpose of asking 
the audience to judge whether they were “pornographic” in nature.309 
The Plaintiff was a photographer who had taken pictures of a model 
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who had just recently been crowned Miss Universe Puerto Rico.310 In a 
nuanced analysis, the court concluded that the nature of the 
Defendant’s reporting revealed a legitimate newsworthy purpose 
insofar as it was not merely for entertainment: the pictures “were 
shown not just to titillate, but also to inform . . . [and] [t]his informative 
function is confirmed by the newspaper’s presentation of various news 
articles and interviews in conjunction with the reproduction.”311 The 
court was careful to note that it was not creating a separate 
newsworthiness exception.312 
An appropriate way of incorporating newsworthiness into the 
fair use inquiry would thus be through utilizing the first factor to 
examine the extent to which the defendant’s actions represent a 
genuine attempt to publish content of a legitimate public concern. The 
category of legitimate public concern might be understood in similarly 
expansive and contextual terms as in the law of privacy, except that it 
should be understood to categorically exclude the mere attempt to 
publicly attribute a work to the author-plaintiff (the essence of 
compelled authorship), unless the author has publicly claimed 
otherwise.313 A newspaper’s attempt to publish a celebrity’s private 
wedding photographs in order to establish the fact of the marriage so 
as to rebut the celebrity’s claims of being single might thus qualify as a 
newsworthy use under the “legitimate public concern” standard.314 At 
the same time, the newspaper’s use of the couple’s “wedding night” 
photographs appear to have little content of legitimate public concern, 
and thus would seem undeserving of such classification.315 Similarly, if 
an individual has publicly disavowed certain views but a newspaper 
obtains a letter authored by that individual and sent to some private 
individuals, its publication might qualify as a newsworthy publication. 
Without the disavowal, however, it would do no more than publicly force 
authorship on the individual. 
Without thus creating an independent newsworthiness 
exception, the fair use doctrine might be adapted to incorporate the idea 
under factor one. The key lies in having courts police the claim of 
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newsworthiness, as they do in privacy law, so as to ensure that the 
expressive content of the work or its origins are a matter of legitimate 
public concern, rather than just an effort to sensationalize or entertain. 
To some this may seem problematic, insofar as it treats “the court as 
the final arbiter” of newsworthiness.316 Yet, in the absence of a tailored 
approach, courts will be moved in the direction of altogether 
disregarding newsworthiness as a legitimate purpose.  
D. Remedial Equilibration 
The final—and perhaps most significant—domain where 
privative copyright claims require balancing against competing 
interests and considerations relates to their enforcement and the 
availability of remedies. If privative copyright claims are indeed a 
distinct and legitimate category of copyright infringement claims and 
deserve separate recognition as such, then it is essential that 
copyright’s standard remedial framework be adapted to the unique 
nature of the harm that they purport to redress and the motivations 
driving such claims. 
It is also in the domain of remedies that courts have interpreted 
the guarantees of the First Amendment to impose significant 
restrictions on private law actions. While these restrictions may not 
carry over to privative copyright claims as a requirement of the law, 
they nevertheless provide important insights into how copyright’s 
remedial framework may be adapted to ensure that privative copyright 
claims do not operate as covert attempts at censorship. 
Given their expurgatory motivation and the reality that 
plaintiffs in privative copyright claims are principally concerned with 
ensuring that the work at issue is not disseminated without their 
consent, an injunction is often a remedy sought by plaintiffs. Of course, 
the injunction only makes sense prior to the defendant’s dissemination 
of the work, after which it becomes largely futile as a remedy, except for 
further acts of dissemination by the same defendant. And rarely do 
plaintiffs have advance notice of the defendant’s intended actions prior 
to their commission. All the same, injunctions are often sought by 
privative copyright plaintiffs either in conjunction with a claim for 
damages (to prevent additional or ongoing dissemination) or when the 
defendant’s actions are imminent. 
In its 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, the 
Supreme Court set out the standard for courts to apply in considering 
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the grant of injunctions.317 The case pertained to permanent 
injunctions, and while it was decided within the context of the Patent 
Act, it has since been extended to copyright law as well, especially since 
the Court’s opinion drew from copyright jurisprudence.318 In the 
opinion, the Court emphasized that in awarding injunctions, courts 
were to consider and examine the applicability of each of the traditional 
four equitable factors to the case before deciding on relief. These four 
factors were (1) irreparable injury, (2) inadequate remedy at law, (3) 
balance of hardships favoring equitable relief, and (4) the public 
interest.319  
The first three factors should have few problems being adapted 
to the unique nature of privative copyright claims. Disseminative harm 
is by its nature irreversible, and no amount of monetary relief can 
substitute for the reputational and dignitary consequences of an 
unauthorized distribution of the work. The remedy of damages—actual 
or statutory—is thus inadequate and mismatched to the nature of the 
harm at issue, and in an overwhelming majority of cases the balance of 
hardships will favor the plaintiff in that the failure to grant the 
injunction is likely to cause more harm to the plaintiff than would the 
actual grant to the defendant. Much like in most intellectual property 
cases, the first three factors are likely to favor the privative copyright 
plaintiff.320 Yet, it is through the fourth equitable factor—the “public 
interest”—that important considerations may enter the picture that 
have hitherto not been directly considered in copyright adjudication. 
The public interest prong of the test for injunctive relief has 
received little focused attention from courts.321 As scholars have noted, 
courts use it as a mechanism through which to affirm their decision on 
the merits, and one court described the factor as little more than a “wild 
card” given its lack of consistent application in the jurisprudence.322 
Leaving aside courts’ (non)application of the prong in other areas, the 
public interest factor is capable of being given direct validation in 
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privative copyright claims. Indeed, the lack of a coherent jurisprudence 
for this factor suggests that courts adjudicating privative copyright 
claims might be able to exercise their equitable discretion in this area 
with few problems. 
Copyright jurisprudence has resisted the creation of an 
independent newsworthiness defense to infringement, and for good 
reason. Yet, newsworthiness as understood today in terms of legitimate 
public interest remains a perfect idea for courts to instantiate at the 
remedial level in determining whether to issue an injunction and enjoin 
the defendant’s actions. A court could determine that the defendant’s 
actions serve the broader public interest because of the nature of the 
content being disseminated—for instance, when it involves matters of 
contemporary political relevance, such as the correspondence of 
someone running for political office. While a court should of course not 
give that fact dispositive consideration in the fair use analysis, it should 
be able to do so when considering the plaintiff’s request for an 
injunction.  
Requiring courts to exercise their equitable discretion in a 
manner commensurate with the nature of the interest at issue is in 
keeping with how courts of equity have long approached their task.323 
As is well known, equity historically forbade courts from issuing 
injunctions against defamatory speech, a rule that has come to be 
relaxed only in recent times.324 Resurrecting the public interest prong 
and repurposing it toward collectivist considerations underlying the 
content at issue would thus be in keeping with this long equitable 
tradition. But perhaps more importantly, it would serve the important 
role of introducing a direct mechanism for First Amendment and free 
speech concerns to be weighed against privative claims during their 
enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
Normative purity is indeed an attractive ideal in the law, and 
one that modern copyright thinking and scholarship have all too 
willingly gravitated toward. Justified by the seemingly utilitarian 
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phrasing of the Constitution as well as the influence of neoclassical 
economic thinking, modern U.S. copyright law has come to be 
shoehorned into a theory of creator incentives, according to which 
copyright exists exclusively to function as a market-based incentive for 
creativity. In its quest for theoretical coherence, this view of copyright 
law has all too readily ignored the important noneconomic ideals that 
the institution of copyright has enshrined since its origins.  
Despite recurrent efforts to move them into the domain of 
privacy law, privative copyright claims have remained a staple of the 
Anglo-American copyright landscape. Built on considerations of 
autonomy and dignity, as they relate to authorship, privative copyright 
claims today present courts with a unique set of challenges. All of these 
challenges, rather ironically, derive from courts’ unwillingness to 
recognize the distinctive nature of these claims and their role within 
the overall copyright landscape. But the problem is hardly 
insurmountable. All that it requires is a basic open-mindedness about 
copyright’s normative commitments and a recognition that in this 
domain, copyright law can learn from the functioning of other types of 
privative claims, which have succeeded in balancing the plaintiff’s 
private interests against censorship concerns emanating from the First 
Amendment.  
Copyright has always been an institution that has affirmed a 
plurality of normative values, and the persistence of privative copyright 
claims confirms this reality. Courts and scholars might find this messy, 
complex, and theoretically inelegant. Yet it represents the story of 
copyright’s evolution, which is hard to ignore or erase. Theoretical 
coherence in the law, while desirable in the abstract, is often at the cost 
of practical reality and experience. Justice Holmes famously noted that 
“to know what [the law] is, we must know what it has been, and what 
it tends to become.”325 Here, as elsewhere, copyright law would do well 
to look to its growth and evolution over time, which together reveal that 
its life has been much more about pragmatism than logic. 
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